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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
There has been a rapid growth in world trade since World War II (WW II), to 
approximately twenty percent (20%) of the total volume of goods and services in the 
global trade.1 This has been due to substantial reductions of barriers to the movement of 
goods, services, and capital through foreign direct investments (FDIs), which have taken 
place alongside the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and its successor, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 Indeed, FDI has been viewed as the major source 
behind globalization amongst trading partners of the WTO. FDI has also been viewed as 
a key factor in the economic growth and development in developing countries,3 carrying 
ideas, jobs, and export markets, as well as capital, from industrial to industrializing 
countries.4 
 
Furthermore, international trade agreements, like the GATT and regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) have gone a long way towards deregulating trade. As a result, there 
are over 1800 binding bilateral treaties that contain provisions related to foreign 
investments.5 There is, however, no comprehensive Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), notwithstanding several attempts that have been initiated by several 
countries, particularly the industrialized ones.6 The MAI started in 1948 when a draft 
                                                 
1 Bora (2002) Development, Trade and the WTO, A Hand Book. World Bank Washington D. C. 171. 
2Chapman, A ‘The multilateral agreement on investment: rationale, outline and issues’ (1997) < http://dsp-
psd.communication.gc.ca/plot/loPBd/PB/bp444-e.htm > [accessed on 7 May 2007] Due to globalization, 
there is growing economic integration and interdependence of countries resulting from increased 
international trade in goods and services, the growth of cross border capital flows and the rapid diffusion of 
technology throughout the world, especially with respect to technological advances, and the increase in 
transport and telecommunications. These technological advances have allowed firms to locate production in 
the most advantageous global locations. 
3 Anonymous (2002): Bilateral investment treaties as a determinant of US foreign direct investment in 
developing countries; http:www.moneymastersinstitute.org/bilateral investment. PDF 
More so, international flows of private investment have risen sharply. FDI jumped from $200 billion in 
1990 to $315 billion in 1995.An increasing share of this investment goes to developing countries. 
4 Fitzgerald et al (1998) 21.The fewer barriers there are to the movement of resources, money, and products 
the more influence the large corporations and investors have in the global economy. 
5 Ngowi (2001). Such treaties include: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Common 
Market of the South (MERCOSUR). 
6 Industrialized countries include: US, German, Australia, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Italy, Canada, 
Japan, Korea, Netherlands, and Belgium etc. 
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charter established the International Trade Organization (ITO) at Havana. The draft failed 
because the United States congress did not ratify it. This resulted in the adoption of the 
GATT. GATT remained silent on investment issues and continued to treat trade and 
investment as separate issues, thus maintaining a line between trade and investment.7 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-oporation and Development (OECD)8 commenced 
negotiations for MAI in 1995 and expected these negotiations to be completed by 1998.9 
The proposed MAI under the OECD requires nations to open virtually all sectors of their 
economies to foreign investment, treat foreign corporations the same as local companies 
and bar governments from altering the rights of investors. Negotiations for MAI have 
generated heated debates amongst developing countries,10 and international 
organizations.11 The proposed MAI seems to benefit the investor and not provide 
significant benefit to the host country,12 by giving more rights to foreign investors 
without stipulating corresponding responsibilities. 
 
                                                 
7  Singh, K (2002): ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the WTO; Issues and Illusions’ <. 
www.aprnet.org > [accessed on 14 April 2007]. 
8 The OECD is an international organization of states, based in Paris. Its goals are the pursuit of global 
economic growth and stability. The Organization consists of 30 members, who account for 2/3 of the 
world’s goods and services. Member countries include: US, Belgium, Canada, German, Australia, Austria, 
Korea, Japan, France, Ireland, Sweden, Italy Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Mexico, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Portugal, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, UK and 
Turkey. 
9 OECD, 1995 < www.oecd.org > [accessed on 7 May 2007]. 
10 Developing countries are the major recipients of FDI, but they have been sidelined during the 
negotiations; developing countries have not been included in drafting the rules. According to Mark 
Villiantos, (1997), the US and other OECD member countries have treated the MAI as a technical 
agreement, negotiated by low profile expert groups with public awareness or input. Amongst developing 
countries, India has remained silent throughout the negotiations. 
11 Non-Governmental Organizations, labour unions, human rights and environmental activists are 
concerned about the implications of the proposed MAI. Developing countries have had little participation 
in concluding negotiations on the MAI, yet they are more vulnerable. Developing countries hold a lot of 
resources, and investors will target where they can access cheap labour thus exploiting workers. 
Liberalisation of investments and free trade allows corporations to pick and choose how to structure their 
operations on the global level. The MAI also lets investors repatriate their profits unrestricted by 
government control, which would affect investment flows. Governments need to retain the authority to 
respond to social, economic and environmental needs to effect sustainable development. NGOs, labour and 
environmental institutions insist that corporations should be required to operate under the rules of the host 
country on environmental and labour standards. 
12 A ‘host country’, for the purpose of this study refers to the country that receives the foreign investment, 
or where the foreign investor directs his investments, other than his own home country. 
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The definition of ‘investment’ is very broad under the proposed investment agreement. It 
involves not only FDI, but also the direct or indirect ownership or control of any other 
asset, for instance portfolio investment.13 An ‘investor’ refers to an individual, company 
or corporation that establishes a new venture in the host country or a country other than 
his own that creates jobs and output, subject to a degree of control.14 
 ‘FDI’ is defined as the transfer of technology and managerial skills as well as capital 
resources, and acquiring an ongoing interest in an enterprise in a country other than the 
investor’s home country.15 FDI involves a degree of ownership and control of a business 
or part of it in another economy.16  Most host nations try to regulate the flow of FDI in 
their countries and developing countries stress that governments need to have the 
authority to control and regulate the entry and operations of foreign investors in order to 
maximize the positive benefits of foreign investment.17 There is a need to balance the 
regulation of entry of investors and their activities on the one hand against reaping the 
benefits that accrue from FDI, on the other. 
 
Developing countries in Africa stand to gain from the proposed MAI membership in the 
global economy. The proposed MAI is the best way to encourage long term productive 
capital formation by foreign and domestic firms, which is required to support sustainable 
development.18 By doing so, developing countries would achieve a substantial reduction 
in investor uncertainty, leading to better investment opportunities.19 The current MAI 
                                                 
13 It involves all sorts of assets management by residents or nationals of contracting parties through 
offshore companies. The inclusion of portfolio investment under the proposed MAI, particularly MFN and 
NT would restrict the ability of governments to impose control on volatile capital flows. The definition of 
investment also involves contract based rights with governments. This will affect concessions and licenses 
in key development sectors such as natural resources. Also investors who control their business under 
offshore holding companies are often incorporated in tax havens. In most cases this is done for tax evasion 
and money laundering.  
14 Samson Muradzikwa, 2002. ‘Foreign direct investment in Africa: a case of the SADC region.’ 
Development Research policy project. Working paper, 02/67. < http://www.uct.ac.za/dept/dpru.> [accessed 
on 21 June 2007]. 
15Muradzikwa ( n. 14 above) 12.  
16 IMF; balance of payments, 1997 manual; 408. ‘FDI is made to acquire a long lasting interest in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor and the investor having choice in the 
management of the enterprise.’ 
17 Anonymous, ‘MAI-type investments model criticized at NGO.’ Ambassadors meeting online 
;http://www.twnsdeorg.sg/title/model [accessed on 28 June 2007]. 
18 The MAI, May 1998, Oxfam community AID Abroad. 
19 See OECD < www.oecd.org/daf/investments > [accessed on 7 May 2007]. 
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draft however represents a consolidation of the existing agreements between OECD 
members, with provision for voluntary accession by non-members. This implies 
accession by a limited number of “middle-industrializing” countries in the immediate 
future.20 The adoption of the MAI is likely to be more problematic for future international 
agreements, especially in the developing countries of Africa, because they are likely to 
give up their control of foreign investments in a need to increase FDIs; this will end up in 
harming their own economies, especially in a situation where foreign investors are 
allowed to freely invest in any sector of a country’s economy. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
With focus on the implications of MAI on FDI in developing countries, Africa’s position 
on investment regulation is shared by other developing countries. Notwithstanding the 
attempts of the OECD, the Agreement requires host countries to give up some of their 
rights and adopt a selective approach to foreign investment to promote their development 
strategy.21 
 
It is important to address some of the concerns and inherent difficulties which may arise 
in the context of MAI and upon which the MAI may succumb. Firstly, MAI increases the 
rights of investors against those of governments; it accords rights to foreign investors 
without any obligations or responsibilities.22 Secondly, the MAI limits the ability of 
governments to regulate FDI in the public interest and transfers control over investment 
decisions from governments to unaccountable companies.23 
 
                                                 
20 E.V.K Fitzgerald and A. Lehman ( 1998): ‘The development implications of MAI.’ 
21 Okhomina 2005:  The quest for a multilateral agreement on investment; Implications for developing 
African countries. Thesis, UWC library. 
22 The strongest provisions in the Agreement are those which protect investors rights, are legally binding 
and backed by a right of direct access to international arbitration. This stretches the arm of international law 
into the service of the powerful and economically strong while neglecting the interests of the economically 
weak. And as such it fails to acknowledge the granting of rights with any responsibilities for the protection 
of the environment, human rights and social improvement. 
23 This affects developing African countries in that it prevents them from pursuing the kind of policies 
which involve a significant degree of state intervention. Also, developing countries have their own 
development strategies; so if they are denied any interference, this affects them in achieving their desired 
goals. 
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The importance of FDI is acknowledged by developing African countries. Indeed given 
the significance of foreign investments, it is imperative that investment rules do not 
weaken the possibility of the contribution of FDI to socially sustainable development, 
especially in the African context. It is recognized that the rapid changes resulting from 
globalization for developing countries clearly have both positive and negative 
implications, and therefore it is the role of international regulation through MAI to ensure 
that the economic benefits are maximized, while social and environmental standards 
remain uncompromised. 
 
Consequently, the purpose of this work is to analyse the consequences of having a MAI 
in light of the proposed OECD Agreement, the implications it may have for developing 
countries in Africa, and the way forward towards a balanced multilateral Agreement. 
 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
 
In most African countries the private sector provides the main impetus for economic 
growth, especially since countries started opening up their economies for foreign 
investment.24 Foreign investments have played an important role in the economic growth 
and development process. FDI can bring a range of benefits to developing countries, 
including, among others, employment, increased exports, skills and technologies, and is 
considered to be an instrument through which economies are being integrated at the level 
of production into the globalizing world economy.25 The flows of capital are, however, 
concentrated in only a small number of developing countries in Africa, e.g. South Africa, 
Botswana, Rwanda, and the least developed, such as Zambia, Burundi and Tanzania, 
attract very little foreign investment. This is problematic for growth and development in 
                                                 
24 Joseph Okere ( 2002): ‘The private sector drives economic growth’; development outreach World Bank 
Institute. The private sector is larger than the public sector in most of the developing countries. For every $ 
1 in net long term flow to the developing world, the private sector invests $ 2-3. The private sector is one of 
the largest and most powerful levers available to foster development in the foreseeable future. It has a high 
developmental impact in sectors such as: financial services, infrastructure, information technology, health 
and education and small and medium enterprises. 
Promoting investment and enterprise development has been agreed upon as one of the major themes for 
international development, and FDI has played a key role in the economic growth and development 
process. UNCTAD, 2002. 
25 UNCTAD 2002. http://www.unctad.org [ accessed on 17 October 2007]. 
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developing countries. This therefore necessitates more research on the regulation of FDI 
and the impact of a MAI for developing countries. It is important that its implications at 
the OECD level are well researched. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The methodology for this thesis shall include qualitative means of data collection and 
analysis. Data collection includes in depth review of primary and secondary information 
in the form of academic or discussion papers, articles, journals, output from other 
research processes, government statistics and internet sources, all relating to trade and 
investment. Primary sources shall include documents. 
 
1.5. Scope of the study 
 
The study covers the following areas: 
 
a) Analysis of the legal framework of MAI, and its implications for investment in 
developing African countries at different levels of development. 
b) A comparison of MAI with other alternative investment frameworks for 
developing countries, such as, bilateral and regional investment agreements, and 
WTO agreements on investment measures (TRIMS and GATS). 
c) Aspects of MAI that have positive or negative implications on the attraction of 
FDI by developing African countries, such as, regulation of FDI. 
(d)  Analysis of Africa’s investment strategies. 
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1.6 Overview of chapters 
 
This study is divided into five chapters: 
 
Chapter 1 contains the introduction and background to the study. It also includes 
the importance of FDI, and regulation of FDI at both regional and multilateral 
levels. 
Chapter 2 analyzes other alternative investment agreements especially at regional 
level, and compares their definitions of ‘investment’, ‘investor’. It also compares 
the rights and obligations under these agreements. 
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on MAI. It also discusses the key 
implications of having a MAI that binds all parties. 
Chapter 4 discusses, in detail, Africa’s investment strategy and economic 
freedom. The chapter focuses on the African Union (AU) and NEPAD. It also 
includes an examination of the importance of a collaborative approach by Africa 
towards economic integration and achieving economic freedom. 
Chapter 5 discusses the recommendations and conclusions of this study. The 
chapter determines whether there is actually a need for MAI, especially for 
developing countries, it also includes a look at the way forward, and possible 
suggestions as to the future development in the field of investment law, if there is 
going to be a MAI, in terms of the negotiation format to suit developing African 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
 
CHAPTER TWO: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND REGULATION 
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
 
 “Regional trade agreements are not the easy way out, we must ensure 
regional trade agreements are a complementary - and not a substitute - to the 
multilateral trading system.” “If the multilateral system dies away, so does the 
positive potential of regional trade agreements”…. Pascal Lamy, Director General, 
WTO, in a speech at the annual memorial silver lecture at the Columbia University 
in New York, 31 October 2006.  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Africa has signed the largest number of bilateral investments treaties (BITS) as a way of 
regulating FDI on the continent,26 and most of these agreements have been signed with 
the big capital exporting countries.27 By 1995, Egypt had signed the most number of 
bilateral treaties, followed by Tunisia and Morocco.28 In Africa, developing countries and  
LDCs would benefit from the increased importance of bilateral agreements, since they 
encourage foreign direct investment from economies with abundant capital and skilled 
labor, mainly the OECD countries, to the less developed economies.29 Notably, Africa is 
relying on BITS in order to ensure that its developmental goals are reached, and this 
explains why Africa has signed the largest number of these agreements. 
 
BITS were designed to address investment related principles which had not been 
exhausted by the existing agreements.  The continued delay in establishing a multilateral 
                                                 
26 Out of 103 states surveyed in the early 1990s, only four did not provide some kind of  investment 
incentive to FDI, UNCTAD (2003), ‘incentives and FDI’, 46, and  world investment report ( 1995) at 
UNDoc. 
27‘Investment screening’ refers to mechanisms that require prior approval for or prohibit entirely, the 
establishment of foreign investments and such mechanisms would be in the foreign investment codes.  
28 UNCTAD (1993) & (1994), World investment report, ‘FDI in Africa’. 
29 Peter, Michael (2004). Journal of comparative economics: ‘The impact of bilateral investment treaties on 
foreign direct investments’.  788-804. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?-ob=Articles [accessed on 4/08/2007]. 
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agreement also accounts for the multiple bilateral treaties that countries are entering into 
in order to solve their investment problems. Bilateral treaties have acted, therefore, as a 
tool to generate economic co-operation amongst the member countries, and to increase 
the flow of FDI in the host country.30 The impact of BITS on FDI is not definitely 
known, because they may increase the flow of foreign investment in some instances and 
in others their positive impact may not be felt. So in order for a country to benefit from 
these bilateral treaties, they first have to strengthen their investment structures at national 
levels.31 
  For example, Hoekman, Bernad and Saggi argue, that, due to some differences in 
national rules, BITS may be the source of higher transaction costs and uncertainty from 
the investing firm’s perspective, especially in situations where the recipient country may 
be characterized by a bureaucratic administration. Therefore, although the role of BITS in 
attracting FDI is significant, they are not a guarantee that a country’s FDI flows will 
automatically increase, as at times the foreign investment inflow is uneven. 
 
BITS also regulate FDI-related issues through their principles of general standards of 
treatment, such as, admission, equitable and fair treatment, expropriation, and the 
settlement of disputes at the bilateral level. They also establish transparency amongst 
members about risk, especially as regards the rules of establishment in the host country. 
The fact that BITS involve few countries makes accountability easier than on a 
multilateral basis, and this helps to promote investor confidence as regards investing in a 
country.32 
Furthermore, the 1990s have seen agreements, both regional and bilateral in which 
investment measures have been emphasized, for example, NAFTA, the EU, Chile, and 
US-Morocco FTA. In fact, the OECD has played an important role in discussions on FDI 
agreements.33 At present this is evidenced by the OECD code of the liberalization of the 
                                                 
30 ‘Bilateral investment treaties as a determinant of US FDI in developing countries’ 
http;//www.moneymattersinstitute.org/bilateralinvestment.pdf, [ accessed on 23 July 2007]. 
31 Hoekman, Bernad M, and Saggi (2000): ‘Multilateral Disciplines for Investment- Related Policies.’ 
Policy Reseach Working Paper No. 2138. World Bank, Development Research Group. Washington D.C. 
32 Peter and Michael 2004: The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment.  
 32, 4,788-804. http;//www.sciencedirect.com/science?ob=Article [ accessed on 2007/08/02]. 
33 Graham and Krugman, 1995: ‘Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.’ Institute of International 
Economics, Washington, D.C.  
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movement of capital, which forms the only multilateral framework on international 
capital flows, including FDI. 
 
In addition, the desire of governments to facilitate FDI is reflected in their regulatory 
changes, and the increase in the number of BITS signed in order to promote FDI.34 This 
is further evidenced by the negotiating asymmetries that are common to bilateral 
agreements, and which have led to treaties in which developing countries have taken on 
substantive obligations without any rights, other than the promise of increasing their 
future private investment.35 
The situation above seems to imply that BITS have a weak link to FDI and do not 
actually automatically increase the flow and attraction of FDI to the signatory countries. 
Accordingly, there is little evidence to show that BITS have played a big role in 
increasing FDI in the host country.36 
 
Before BITS were introduced, customary law, known as the Hull Rule, applied and was 
used to protect foreign investments.37 It dealt with expropriation, which gave the investor 
the right to sue the host government if it undertook actions that were meant, or deemed, 
to substantially expropriate the business of the firm, and guaranteed the investor 
compensation in the event of expropriation. Under the Hull Rule, there was no right of 
entry or admission required to invest in a foreign country. The state reserved the right to 
determine which foreign investor to allow in which sector.38 
BITS contain general standards of treatment, including, fair and equitable treatment, 
national treatment and most- favoured nation treatment (MFN), expropriation and dispute 
                                                                                                                                                 
Many of the existing BITS between the current OECD economies involve one old and one new OECD 
member, e.g., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic concluded BITS with old 
OECD members in the early 1990s and then joined the OECD afterwards. 
34 UNCTAD,1997 19. 
35 World Bank, 2003 127. 
36Hallward- Driemier. (2003):’ Do bilateral investment treaties attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could 
bite.’  World Bank, DECRG.  
37 The Hull Rule was based on the customary law rule of adequate compensation. It was, however , limited 
to expropriation. The Hull Rule was challenged at the UN by developing countries and this resulted in 
changing its status as customary international law. 
38 Concept paper on non-discrimination document (2000).  Under customary law there is no requirement for 
a host country to be non- discriminatory against foreign investors wishing to establish their businesses in 
that country:   
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settlement.39 In Africa, many countries have concluded BITS for the avoidance of over 
taxation of income and capital,40 implying that the more trading partners a country has, 
the more the costs involved, but BITS have found a way of minimizing costs by reducing 
tariffs. 
 
2.2 ANALYSING PERFORMANCE IN THE NAFTA, AND THE US-MOROCCO 
FTAs 
 
BITS are agreements establishing the conditions and terms for private investment by 
nationals and companies of one state in another state.41 They have gained popularity, 
especially amongst developing countries and LDCs, over the years. They tend to impose 
less responsibility on countries yet they are a relatively new phenomenon on the 
international investment agenda and their impact is only beginning to be understood. The 
weaknesses of the domestic, political and legal environments in many low and middle 
income countries has led investors to seek alternatives to their needs through BITS, 
which provide clear and enforceable rules to protect foreign investment and reduce 
investor risks. 
 
 In the African context, bilateral treaties allow for certain rights, obligations and 
limitations to be stated and negotiated by the parties. 
 
For the purpose of this work, this section shall focus on two FTAs: Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA and the US-Morocco FTAs.42 
                                                 
39 NT and MFN are major principles of non-discrimination. The MFN implies that each member shall grant 
any other member the most-favourable and best treatment it grants to any other country.  NT applies to 
domestic and imported products, and prohibits giving preferential treatment to the domestically produced 
goods as against the imported  goods. Expropriation refers  to a situation where the investor may sue the 
host government for compensation if actions undertaken by the government are deemed to substantially 
expropriate the business of the firm,( Hallward- Driemier ( 2003). ‘Do bilateral investment treaties attract 
FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite’ World Bank, DECRG.  
40 UNCTAD 1995. Foreign direct investment in Africa, UNCTAD/DTCI/19, current studies series A, No 
28 UN New York and Geneva 13. 
41 Impact of BITS on developing countries: Online, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bila-inv.[ accessed on 8 
August 2007]. 
42 The two Agreements ( NAFTA and US- Morocco) have been chosen for this study because one involves 
a developing African country and the other developed countries like the US, which fall within the interest 
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The US –Morocco FTA was signed on 15 June 2004 and consists of 24 chapters and four 
annexes.43 It largely contains provisions found in recent US trade agreements with Chile, 
Australia and Singapore. The agreement included that, more than 95% of bilateral trade 
in consumer and industrial products would become duty free under the accord, with the 
phasing out of all other duties within a period of nine years.44 
 
This chapter will focus on the similarities in most of these provisions in the agreements; 
definitions of investment and investor, performance requirements, conditions of entry, 
MFN and national treatment principles, expropriation, transfer of capital/ funds and 
dispute resolution 
 
2.3 Definition of ‘Investor’ 
Generally, an investor45 is a party who purchases an asset with the expectation of 
financial rewards and who exercises greater control in the running of the business.46 
The US-Morocco FTA does not actually define an investor but rather distinguishes 
between an investor of another party; as an investor who attempts or has made an 
investment in the territory of that party and is not an investor of either party. An investor 
of a party means a party or state or national enterprise of a party that is attempting to or 
has made an investment in the territory of the other party. 
 
Definitions in FTAs however, seem to be more detailed in their definitions of investor, 
especially as concerns an investor of a party and of a non-party. The agreement further 
states that a person with dual nationality is deemed exclusively to be a national of the 
state of his dominant and effective nationality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of this paper. The US has been chosen because it is a major trader with African countries, for instance, in 
its AGOA project. NAFTA is of interest because it involves key players in the world trade. It will be used 
for comparison purposes. 
43 Assad 2002: American journal on international law, Volume 98, pg 836. Online http://www.ustr.gov. 
[accessed on 5 August 2007]. 
44 Assad (n.43 above) 836. 
45 See  Chapter one. 
46 Online, http;//www.answers.com/investor&=67. [accessed on 3/08/2007]. 
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The NAFTA has a different definition because it draws a distinction between the investor 
of a party and investor of a non-party. 
Art 1139 defines an ‘investor’ as a party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
enterprise of such party, that seeks to make, is making, or has made an investment. An 
investor of a non-party is defined as one other than an investor of a party that seeks to 
make, is making or has made an investment. 
 
2.4 Performance Requirements 
Performance requirements enable the host country to influence trading and location 
decisions of foreign investors in favour of its own development. Export requirements can 
improve the balance of payments accounts of a host country and locational incentives can 
aid its infrastructural development.47 
Further, performance requirements are the major conditions of entry that a nation gives to 
foreign investors to fulfill before they can start their operations in that country. They have 
been used by both the developed and developing countries and other policy instruments 
like, incentives, trade policy and screening mechanisms, to satisfy development 
objectives.48 
 
Performance requirements at times cause investors to pursue practices which they would 
not have adopted in the open market. Accordingly, many developed countries are trying 
to limit the kind of performance requirements imposed on investors.49 
There are different views regarding the effectiveness of performance requirements with 
regard to development strategies: the critics say that, its impact on investment is limited, 
costly and counter-productive.50 On the other hand, they are an important instrument for a 
country’s FDI policy. 
 
                                                 
47 Jennifer and Suzan Rose: Foreign direct investment and the business environment in developing 
countries; The impact of bilateral investment treaties. June,4 2004. 
48 UNCTAD, 2003. Foreign direct investment and performance requirements. New evidence from selected 
countries online, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteii20037,enpdf visited on 21 August 2007. 
49 For example US BITS prohibit investment performance requirements. 
50 Nagesh, Kumar, WTOs emerging investment regime; Way forward for DOHA ministerial meeting. 
August 18, weekly 36(33), 3151-58. 
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The use of world market pricing to determine distant transactions between companies can 
regulate transfer pricing instead of performance requirements and they are not the best 
way to solve balance of payment problems which can easily be dealt with using fiscal 
policies or exchange rate depreciation.51 
Moreover, is important to note that some types of FDI have more favourable 
developmental externalities than others. This implies that more emphasis is required by 
host countries to determine the quality of FDI inflows, than merely attracting greater 
magnitudes of FDI. 
 
Kumar further notes that the policies of host countries have an important bearing on the 
quality of FDI inflows they receive.52 
The US has adopted different types of performance requirements for foreign investors, 
especially when it was the biggest capital importing country in the nineteenth century.53 
The EU has also adopted certain regulations, such as the local content requirement, to 
deepen the local commitment of Japanese corporations in the consumer goods 
industry.54The EU has further applied the anti-dumping measures to regulate car imports 
from Japan and south-east Asia.55 
 
Accordingly, the NAFTA, states that “No party may impose or enforce any of the 
following requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in connection with 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an 
investment of an investor of a party or of a non-party in its territory.” 
It further lists quite a number of performance requirements which are forbidden under 
article 1106 (1) a-g, such as the requirement to export a given level of or percentage of 
goods and services, a given level of domestic content, purchases of services and goods 
locally, relating to volume and value of imports to exports or the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows, technology transfer, a production process or other proprietary 
                                                 
51 UNCTAD, 2003. 
52Kumar (2002), Investment on the WTO agenda; A developing country perspective and the way forward  
for the Cancun Ministerial Conference. Pg 8online http;//www.ris.org visited 4 August 2007 
53 Kumar(n.52 above) 9. 
54 Safarian, A.E. 2002: The use and impact of performance requirements in the developed countries, 
Geneva, UNCTAD. 
55 Safarian (n.54 above) 23.  
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knowledge to a person in its territory except in enforcing a court order for violation, 
competition laws or an Act inconsistent with the agreement, and to act as an exclusive 
supplier of the goods it produces or services it provides to a specific region or on the 
world market.56 
It further states under paragraph 6, that the measures are not a disguised barrier to 
international trade and nothing under paragraph 1(b), (c) or 3(a) shall prevent any party 
from adopting measures to protect human, plant and animal health, exhaustible natural 
resources or to secure the compliance with regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
agreement.57 
 
It is notable that FTAs are extensive in their provisions. The provisions under the US-
Morocco agreement are not any different from those of NAFTA except that it includes 
Article 36 of the (TRIPS) and excludes “for export promotion and foreign aid 
programs.”58 
 
2.5 TREATMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTORS 
 
Bilateral investments treaties have found favour with developing countries because they 
do not place many restrictions on host countries in following their own FDI policies in 
the light of each country’s unique needs and circumstances.59 Different investors apply 
different considerations for investment before they decide on whether to invest in a 
particular country. These include the amount of protection accorded to foreign 
investments, investors, and property. 
BITS provide for two basic provisions; NT and MFN principles. These are non-
discriminatory provisions to ensure that foreign investors are treated in a manner that is 
equal and fair, compared to investors from other non-party countries. The US-Morocco 
agreement provides under article 11 (3), that, “Investments shall at all times be accorded 
                                                 
56 Article 1106. NAFTA 
57 Paragraph 6 of article 1106. 
58 Paragraph.1(a),( b), (c) and 2(a), (b) of article 1106 of NAFTA. 
59 Luke Eric Peterson. Bilateral Investment Treaties. International Institute for sustainable development, 
Nov, 2004. online http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade bits.pdf visited on 24 August 2007. 
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fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case 
be accorded treatment less than that required by international law.” NAFTA considers the 
general standard of treatment under article 1104, and states that, “Each party shall accord 
to investors of another party and to investments of investors of another party the better of 
the treatment required under articles, 1102 and 1103 (NT and MFN). 
 
2.5. 1 NATIONAL TREATMENT 
The concept of NT is aimed at eliminating discrimination against foreign investment, 
especially between firms in the same sector.60 NT differs from state to state. Some 
countries have post entry establishment provision for national treatment. 
 
The US- Morocco FTA provides that foreign investors shall be treated no less favourably 
than its own investors as well as non-party investors.61 
The NAFTA includes a similar provision which is more elaborate; it states that, with 
respect to a state or province, treatment no less favourable than the most- favourable 
treatment accorded in like circumstances, by that state or province to investors, and to 
investments of investors of the party of which it forms a part.62 
 
Articles 1102 and 1103 of the NAFTA on National treatment and Most-Favored nation 
principle state that they apply to investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use and sale or other disposition of 
investments.63 
Under the NAFTA, the three countries had to list the sectors they wanted excluded from 
the right of establishment, e.g., the energy sector in Mexico. Any sector not listed is 
covered by chapter 11 and is open to investment by investors of the other NAFTA 
countries without discrimination. 
 
 
                                                 
60OECD,1993 National Treatment for foreign investors-Controlled enterprises Paris OECD pg 62-64,22.  
61 Article 11, US-Morocco agreement. 
62 Article 1102 NAFTA. 
63 Articles 1102 and 1103 0f NAFTA. 
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2.5. 2 MOST-FAVOURED NATION  
Any investor would want to face equal and fair treatment with regard to his investments 
in another country. This concept has been catered for in BITS. Most BITS contain a 
provision related to MFN, and has become an important indication of economic 
liberalisaton.64 
 
The NAFTA insists on treatment of investors of another party in a manner no less 
favourable than the treatment given to investors of another party in the acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct operation and sale or other disposition of investments 
in its territory.65 
The US –Morocco agreement does not differ from NAFTA in this regard, except that it 
applies the phrase ‘covered investments’ unlike in other agreements.66 
 
2.6 EXPROPRIATION 
Expropriation is a common clause in many BITS which gives the investor the right to sue 
the host government if actions undertaken by it are deemed to substantially expropriate 
the business of the firm. The terms under which expropriation is deemed unlawful and 
compensation is to be given, differ from one country to another.67  Different countries 
have a different interpretation of payment of full value. It has been interpreted to imply 
that adequate compensation in accordance with the prevailing market value and in 
convertible currency, should be paid without delay.68 
 
Expropriation provisions under NAFTA and the US-Morocco FTA are more elaborate 
and similar.69 They both consider that compensation be paid with interest on the currency 
                                                 
64 The principle has been extensively included in discussions at the WTO, which insist that global trade 
should not be discriminative amongst member countries. No member country should be put at a better 
advantage than others. 
65 Article 1103 (1) of NAFTA. 
66 Article 11 US-Morocco agreement 
67 Property can only be legally expropriated if it is done for a public purpose. It is done on a non-
discriminatory basis and compensation is paid. Expropriation is done with the right process of law. The 
compensation clauses are deemed to have a number of consequences, especially where its deemed to be 
done adequately, promptly, and effectively or where payment is to given in the property’s full value. 
68 Investment protection proclamation, no 37/1996 of Ethiopia, Art. 21. 
69 Article 1110 of NAFTA, and Article 10.6 of the US-Morocco FTA. 
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being used for repayment from the date of expropriation to the date of payment. Both 
Agreements insist that payment is to be made without delay and in full amount, and 
freely transferable, with interest accrued from the date of expropriation to the date of 
payment. 
Article 1110 of NAFTA provides for expropriation and compensation, and states that, 
“No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation of such an investment.” It lays down exceptional circumstances under 
which expropriation may take place under article 1110 (1) (a-d).70 
These provisions of NAFTA are similar to article 111 of US- Morocco agreement.71 
 
BITS have a more detailed aspect of compensation provisions72where emphasis is put 
more on payment of interest than on the value of the property expropriated. 
 
2.7 CONDITIONS OF ENTRY AND ESTABLISHMENT 
 
Governments set different conditions for a foreign investor to invest in a country. Some 
countries limit investment in some areas of their economy, and prefer them to be 
dominated by local investors.73 
Some governments are strict regarding the amount of investment the investor intends to 
invest. Where it relates to capital requirements, the government requires the foreign 
                                                 
70 The circumstances include: for public purpose, on a non- discriminatory basis, in accordance with due 
process of law and on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 2. 
71 It provides that “investments shall not be nationalized or expropriated either directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation except for public purpose, in a non- discriminatory manner, upon 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and 
the general principles of treatment.” 
72 Although the determination of compensation is difficult in itself, the BITS strongly enforce that 
compensation is to be paid immediately, in full value and effectively. In NAFTA, Canada reserved the right 
to continue reviewing foreign investments, Mexico insisted on raising its foreign investment review 
threshold to $150 million within 10 years. 
73 Some sectors of the economy are too sensitive to allow an outsider to invest in, many governments strive 
not to allow foreign investors in areas of security, banking and finance and insurance to avoid situations 
where the investor may defraud the public or even leave behind a crisis when he decides to leave the 
country. 
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investor to bring most of its capital into the country, especially when there is a need to 
increase foreign currency in the country.74 
 
It is a strategy for host countries to refrain from granting a right of establishment to 
foreign investors in order to retain a degree of control and deregulation of their domestic 
economy.75 The ability to retain control is a very important strategy, especially, for 
developing African countries, in order to boost their upcoming industries and ensure 
fulfillment of their development plans. 
 
Driemier further states that,76 most treaties do not extend to cover market access 
privileges or rights of establishment to foreign investors although recent BITS include 
commitments at the pre-establishment level.77 
 
2.8 DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
BITS have been concluded by developed countries as a way to ensure the security of FDI 
generally, but structures that have been established to litigate disputes arising from such 
agreements do not acknowledge the interest of developing countries, especially African 
countries, or greater democratization of international institutions.78  The entire process of 
arbitration remains in secrecy.79 
Not all arbitrations provide for public disclosure of claims, they are therefore solved 
using a number of arbitral rules 
 
                                                 
74In Mexico, the energy sector is not open to foreign investors investing therein. Okhomina (2005), writes 
that in Australia, foreign investors are not allowed to buy any finished estates, and that in Ethiopia, they are 
not allowed into the banking and insurance sectors. 
75 Driemier (n.36 above) 38. 
76 Driemier (n.36 above) 18. 
77 Canada, Japan, and US are given as examples. They give NT or MFN to investors wishing to establish an 
investment or make an acquisition of an existing enterprise. The decisions of the host state regarding 
questions of establishment are however not eligible for arbitration under the treaties dispute settlement 
rules.  
78 Neil Sorensen, Bilateral investment treaties and Disputes. Program associate, Globalisation and 
globalism program; Institute of agriculture and trade policy, February, 2001. online 
http;//www.bilaterals.org visited on 7 September 2007. 
79 Neil Sorensen (n.78 above) 9 
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Most of the earliest treaty claims arose out of a clear cut dispossession or destruction of 
property. More recent investor claims pertain to a much broader range of alleged 
violations, including treatment at the hands of the host country’s regulatory, 
administrative or tax authorities.80 
 
The provision on dispute settlement is one that is common in many BITS. It is important 
in any agreement because parties have to agree on the choice of law to govern the 
agreement. 
Dispute settlement under NAFTA provides for settlement between a party and an investor 
of another Party.81 It also provides for claims by an investor on his own behalf or on 
behalf of the enterprise.82 
 
Disputes arising out of NAFTA are resolved at the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). After six months of the claim, the matter is submitted to an 
arbitrator under: the ICSID convention, the additional facility rules of ICSID and the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules.83 
The rules of the ICSID will only apply if either parties or one of them is a member of the 
convention 
 
It states that, the disputing investor shall deliver to its opponent party written notice of its 
intention to submit a claim to arbitration at least 90 days before the claim is submitted. 
The notice to submit shall specify the name and address of the disputing investor, aspects 
of breach, facts of the claim, relief sought and the actual amount of damages claimed.84 
 
Generally, proceedings under BITS are not governed by precedents, and are not subject 
to publication, except where it is stipulated by the countries laws.85 
                                                 
80 Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral investment treaties. International institute for sustainable development, 
November, 2004. online http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade/bits.pdf. 
81 Article 1115 of NAFTA. 
82 Article 1117 of NAFTA. 
83 Article 1120 (1) of NAFTA. 
84 Article 1119 of NAFTA.  
85 Countries like the US are obliged to make documents available to the public as by its Freedom of 
Information Act. This concept as noted by Mary Hallward do not apply to all countries. 
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Luke Eric, Peterson, a critic of the NAFTA, indicates that the subsequent rulings under 
NAFTA have failed to resolve the uncertainty which has arisen with respect to the line 
between legitimate host government treatment of foreign investors and conduct which 
violates standard treaty provisions, such as those on fair and equitable treatment, NT or 
expropriation. Therefore, foreign investors have been encouraged by the legal uncertainty 
surrounding the meaning of key treaty rules to turn to investment treaties with increasing 
frequency, and in an effort to challenge an expanding range of government interference.86 
 
In NAFTA it is noted that the scope and meaning of the various provisions of chapter 11 
is a matter of both uncertainty and legitimate public interest.87 
 
The US-Morocco FTA provides for negotiation and consultation before the claim is 
instituted. Where the negotiations have failed, the party claiming may then submit the 
case to arbitration on his own behalf, indicating that the respondent has breached an 
obligation under the agreement, and that the claimant has suffered loss or damage by 
reason of that breach.88 
 
The only difference between the two Agreements is that, under the US-Morocco 
agreement, the claimant does not have to institute a claim first, on his behalf or on behalf 
of the enterprise, the process begins with negotiations.89 
 
 
2.9 TRANSFER OF CAPITAL/ FUNDS 
 
Any foreign investor wishes to be granted the right to repatriate his profits from the 
investing country back to his own home country. Most BITS are flexible when it comes 
to profit repatriation; they guarantee the right to transfer profits in hard currency to the 
                                                 
86 Hallward Driemier (n. 76 above)21. 
87 It was concluded in the case of Mondev international ltd V USA, award, October 11,2002 at Para 159. as 
quoted from Hallward Driemier 2003. “Do BITS increase FDI? Only a bit and they bite. 
88 Article X of the US-Morocco FTA. 
89 Article VI US-Morocco FTA 
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home country.90  Although repatriation may have its own negative consequences 
especially for developing countries, some countries have instituted an exception clause 
for times of economic emergency.91 
 
The scope of transfer is wider in developed countries than in developing countries. 
Among developed countries it includes any additional amounts to maintain or increase an 
investment, returns, payment of loans, proceeds from liquidation or sale of any part of the 
business and compensation in times of repatriation.92 
 
The US-Morocco FTA, provides that each party shall permit returns in kind related to a 
covered investment to be made as authorized or specified in a written agreement between 
the party and the covered investment or an investor of the other party. 
The agreement also considers payments arising from a dispute to be part of  its forms of 
transfer. Article IV states that “Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an 
investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory: Such 
transfers include; returns compensation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, 
payments made under contract including interest payments made pursuant to a loan 
agreement, proceeds from sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment and 
additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment.” 
“Transfers shall be made in a freely usable currency at the prevailing market rate of 
exchange on the date of transfer with respect to spot transactions in the currency to be 
transferred.”93 
 
Unlike many BITS the US-Morocco FTA is more sensitive to environmental needs. 
Under Article10.10 of the Agreement, investment in its territory is undertaken in a 
manner sensitive to environmental needs of the country.94 
                                                 
90 Zachary, Andrew and Beth. The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960-2000, International 
organization 60, fall 2006,pp 811-846. 
91 See Suzan-Rose Ackerman (2004).’FDI and the business environment in developing countries’ who cites 
an example of the French-Argentina BIT, it is discussed that the ability to repatriate profits may lead to 
liquidity problems faced by the host country, especially following the devaluation of the peso. 
92 OECD 1995: Towards Multilateral investment rules Paris, 142-43. 
93 Article IV (2) US- Morocco FTA. 
94 Article 10.10 of US-Morocco agreement. 
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NAFTA provides under article 1109 that, any transfers relating to an investment in 
contracting states should be freely made without any delay.95 
It further provides under article 1109 (2) that, no party may require its investors to 
transfer, or penalize its investors that fail to transfer the income, earnings, profits or other 
amounts attributable to investments in the territory of another party. This does not 
however stop a party from restricting transfers acting in good faith and not discriminating 
in the event of bankruptcy, criminal or penal offences. 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
As discussed above, it is the overall objective of BITS to ensure protection of foreign 
investors and put restrictions on the host governments regarding safety for foreign 
investors and investments. 
It is also clear that BITS intend to design a mechanism for dispute settlement in cases 
where a dispute may arise from such issues relating to investment. 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism by arbitration under BITS seems to be a costly venture 
particularly for the host governments, especially when it comes to compensation. Most 
BITS provide for full compensation, but the problem is to determine a real valuation of 
the compensation, which they do not properly explain. 
Choosing international law as the method of dispute settlement is very important for the 
foreign investor. It places the investor in a predictable position in case a dispute arises 
from the agreement or as a result of government interference. 
Although international arbitration may be costly, therefore, it seems more efficient than 
court litigation. 
 
Whether BITS have greatly increased the flow of FDI in the host countries remains a 
question of debate because having regard to the literature, there is little evidence to this 
effect. The countries with less developed institutions attract little FDI as compared to 
those already developed with established institutions. Foreign investors are interested in 
                                                 
95 Article 1109 of the NAFTA. 
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establishing their investments in countries with a strong legal system, and where investor 
protection is guaranteed. 
 
 
BITS however seem more flexible to developing countries since they place fewer 
restrictions on the host government. This allows the host country to follow its own FDI 
structures and fulfill the stipulated development goals, unlike the MAI which places the 
host country in a weaker position as regards control over its own development policies. 
It is important, therefore, that provisions relating to protection of foreign investors under 
BITS do not interfere with the host country’s ability to boost the nation’s welfare. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATION IN 
AFRICA 
 Attraction of FDI is on the agenda of most developing countries including those in 
Africa. FDI is important, especially to developing countries, for it carries with it a 
number of benefits; jobs, improved technology, market access, as well as capital from 
developed to developing countries. 
The question which arises however is: which factors most influence the flow of FDI in 
the global market? Several policies have been designed: for instance, promoting local 
skills development to meet investor needs and expectations, improving domestic 
infrastructure, providing targeted fiscal incentives like tax concessions, cash grants, and 
improving the regulatory environment in the host country.96 
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have been the primary channels for transmitting FDI 
to developing countries in the last two decades.97 According to OECD, 2006, it is noted 
that while many developing and emerging economies continue to open up their 
economies to international participation, the international security conscience and fears of 
negative consequences of globalization have prompted the governments of most OECD 
                                                 
96 Blomstrom and Ari 2003: Do tax incentives compete for foreign direct investment? Working paper 168, 
Stockholm school of economics, January 2003. Online www.oecd.org [accessed] 6 September 2007. 
97 Kenneth Mwenda 1999; World Bank Legal Aspects of  FDI in Zambia. Vol. 6, No. 4, mwenda64.html. 
 
 
 
 
 30
countries to review their FDI regulations,98 and that following concerns of national 
security and other important public interests, authorities have reviewed, and in some 
cases discouraged, foreign participation in areas of strategic interest.99 
 
Legislation is one fundamental way of regulating FDI in developing countries in Africa 
and else where. Customary international law recognizes the sovereign rights of every 
state to tax alien residents or those owning property within their territories. The 
establishment of unfair taxation against nationals and their property is an unfair act which 
may give rise to protests, since host countries have a similar motive to attract FDI. 
Foreign investors are placed in a more advantageous situation than the domestic 
investors, for example, some countries offer tax holidays to investors and other related 
incentives which the domestic investors do not get yet they are at times in the same 
industry. This has caused friction between the foreign and domestic investors and at some 
point, the governments have been attacked for the unfairness. 
 
Mwenda argues, that although legislation is important in regulating foreign investments, 
it is not on its own sufficient to attract FDI; there is a need to look at the socio-economic, 
political and cultural climate in the recipient country.100 The positive impact of FDI will 
largely depend on the strength of domestic regulations. 
It is apt to note that Africa depends on natural resources for its economic growth and 
development. Less developed countries will receive a disproportionate amount of FDI 
flows into their natural resources sector.101 
 
                                                 
98 OECD 2006. 
99 OECD(n.98 above) 14. 
100 Mwenda discusses the views on FDI in Zambia. It is true, however, to note that there are, other than the 
legal systems factors that may influence a foreign investor to invest in the country. Many scholars have 
tried to do research on the determinants of FDI especially in developing countries. Major determinants 
include incentives, administrative barriers, environment, and countries whose investment climate is clouded 
with political insecurity and poor public and corporate governance are unlikely to attract much foreign 
investment, OECD 2006. 
101Richard McNally 2000: Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development. A discussion paper for 
CSD WWF-UK CSD brief. online, http//csdngo.igc.org/finance/paper-wwf-fdi-htm visited on 6 September 
2007. 
About 52% of FDI flows to Africa from France is in the primary sector. FDI in the primary sector does not 
provide the host country with the same benefits as manufacturing or services. 
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Countries tend to ignore environmental regulation for fear of losing potential investors. 
They fear raising environmental standards and risk losing the competitive edge for rival 
firms in other less regulated countries. To attract foreign investors countries are going out 
of their way to offer financial incentives that often have negative implications for the 
environment.102  In Uganda, for example, there seems to be a loss of environmental 
sensitivity especially on the part of the executive arm of government, where the oldest 
and biggest forests are being given away to ‘potential investors’ to reclaim and set up 
industries.103 The terms under which this is being done remain unclear to the public and 
environmental activists. 
 
According to McNally, the problems with foreign direct investment do not come from 
over- protection and over-regulation; problems arise because FDI is under- regulated, and 
countries are putting their domestic economies at a disadvantage in order to attract new 
investments. The solution, however, is to increase a host country’s capacity to regulate, 
construct international standards, and, because of the economic differences between the 
developed and developing countries, the developed have to increase assistance to build a 
strong regulatory capacity. 
Regulation of investments is sufficient to achieve sustainable development and good 
governance.104 
 
The wide spread privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in developing countries 
has focused attention on the need for an effective regulatory framework.105 Privatisation 
requires clear rules regarding procedures, as well as transparency. In Africa there have 
                                                 
102 Richard McNally 24. In the UK, US, EU and Australia, threats of industrial location have defeated and 
weakened the proposals on energy taxation. 
103In Uganda, it looks like the principle of separation of powers as constitutionally provided is in its dying 
stages. The president, (executive) can interfere in any organ  of government and take conclusive decisions 
as he pleases. Considering the Mabira forest saga, where he was giving away one of the oldest forests to an 
Indian foreign investor, Mehta, to reclaim and plant sugar cane. When the matter was tabled before the 
parliament of Uganda and the national forestry authority, the president referred to them as ignorant 
politicians and warthogs. The director of the National Forestry Authority resigned. Reported by the Daily 
Monitor, April 2007.        
104  McNally(n.111) 16. 
105 Collin, David and Others. ‘Foreign Direct Investment in infrastructure in developing countries; Does 
regulation make a difference?’ Transnational corporations, (2006) 15 
 
 
 
 
 32
been successful examples in Uganda and Ghana of privatization with strong participation 
of foreign investors.106 
The effects of privatization in developing countries indicate that, in general, it has 
improved the economic performance of former state owned enterprises.107 
 Collin further states that, privatization per se may not be the critical factor in raising 
productivity and reducing production costs, but rather, the requirement for privatization is 
the effectiveness of the regulatory regime in promoting competition and controlling anti-
competitive behavior of the dominant firms. 
 
 
Corruption is yet another factor required to be dealt with in order to ensure proper 
regulation of foreign investment in Africa. Corruption is divided into two categories; 
political corruption and economic corruption. Both categories ordinarily refer to a 
situation where a public office is used for private gain, for example, an official or agent 
entrusted with carrying out a task engages in some kind of malfeasance for private 
enrichment which is very difficult for the principal to monitor.108 Sometimes corruption 
is interchanged with illegality in describing a transaction, although not all illegal acts are 
corrupt. 
 
Although some economists, like Nathaniel (1964), think that corruption may be a better 
way to negotiate bureaucracies to an efficient outcome, the international community has 
condemned such acts especially in regard to international business transactions and 
procurement. 
 
First and foremost, the US prohibits American individuals and corporations from bribing 
foreign government officials and states under its legislation enacted in 1976 and 1977; 
that tax penalties, fines and prison terms shall be executed for American companies 
                                                 
106Maria Pigatto (2000): ‘The FDI environment in Africa.’ Online, http/www.fias.net/ifcext/fias.nsf 
[accessed on 11 September 2007].  
107 Collin, David and others, cite from Parker and KirkPatrick,(2004). 
108 Bardhan and Pranab 2001; The Development of Corruption University of California at Berkeley. Online 
http://www.web37.epnet.com/externalframe [accessed on 30/4/2007]. 
 
 
 
 
 33
which pay bribes.109 With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977, the US started 
a campaign for stronger international regulation of bribery of foreign officials, although it 
received less support from its partners who reasoned that imposing stricter national 
regulation hurts the export industry,110 while favouring competing country exports, 
especially of those with a lower standard of ethics.111 
 
Secondly, the OECD countries also launched a joint initiative to improve the conduct of 
their exports business. In May 1994 the OECD Council on Bribery recommended that 
each member examine its criminal, civil and tax laws in order to prevent the bribery of 
foreign officials.112 OECD criminalized in 1996 the bribery of foreign public officials, 
and since then it has become an offence amongst members. 
 
Thirdly, the UN has also condemned such acts through the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC), and has called upon its members to enact laws prohibiting 
extortion and bribery.113 Also, international agencies, for example, the World Bank and 
Transparency International have enacted programs to ensure open and fair contracting for 
their projects. From the different efforts put forward by different organizations, it can be 
observed that the impact of both corruption and bribery is now widely acknowledged, in 
that they distort markets and competition, undermine the rule of law, and destroy the 
integrity of the private sector. 
 
In Africa, bribery and corruption have had a tremendous impact on the amount of FDI  
inflows into the continent, and due to the weak legal systems available, investors fear 
losing their investments if they are incapable of giving bribes. As it has been stated, some 
countries like the US forbid such practices and investors from those countries will be 
                                                 
109 Hines Jr. 1995: Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American business after 1977; University of 
Michigan 23. 
110 Johann Graff 1998: Bribery in international Trade; European Journal of Development volume 10, issue 
1 p 40, 20p. 
111 For example, When a US power generating company withdrew after being asked for a bribe of $3m in 
the Middle East, a Japanese company quickly stepped in; and whereas, Lockheed was convicted of making 
payments of $1.5m to an Egyptian government official, the corrupt activities of European and Asian 
competitors comply with their domestic legal standards. 
112 Transparency international 1995: 87-8. 
113 Heinemann and Others : ‘The Long War against Corruption’; ( 2006) 85 Foreign Affairs 
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discouraged. Corruption in African countries is seen more within the oil extracting 
countries and during tendering processes; therefore in order for African countries to 
attract more FDI, they need to strengthen their laws and reduce bureaucracies within their 
administration as well as ensuring open tendering in order to enjoy the benefits of 
increased FDI.   
 
For most investors, both local and foreign, time is of the essence to determine whether to 
invest or not. A country which takes a long time to allow the investors to establish 
themselves is likely to scare off foreign investments, as the more time spent on the 
processes increases the costs incurred. Such delays usually occur at the times of entry and 
establishment in the host country.114 Although regulation is necessary, when excessively 
done, it may lead to losses on behalf of the investor. 
 
Access to land is yet another issue for most foreign investors in determining whether to 
invest in a country or not. In Africa, it is difficult for non- citizens to buy and own land. 
In most cases investors obtain leases from the government. When an investor has 
succeeded in getting the land, the next regulatory challenge is to acquire permits for 
construction, development, and workers.115 
 
As regards the incentive framework, most developing countries have signed bilateral, 
regional, as well as multilateral agreements, with international organizations.116 
Restrictions on external account transactions have been eliminated and many countries 
now rely on market based exchange rates. 
Pigatto states that, harmonization of investment laws and incentives have been 
intensifying during the last couple of years, in East Africa and Southern Africa that 
adhere to cross border initiatives (CBI). They have adopted a common roadmap for 
                                                 
114Margeret Kigozi, Director Uganda investment Authority, Annual Report 2001-2002, pg 4. Emphasizes 
that in Uganda, for example, investors are obliged to first establish that the project generates economic 
benefits, like foreign exchange, employment, use of local raw-materials and technological transfer. 
115 Maria Pigatto (n.106 above)37. 
116 Maria Pigatto (n.115 above) 38. 
 
 
 
 
 35
investment facilitation, and countries have agreed to codify regulatory provisions into a 
single document.117 
 
Generally, as Collin states,118 regulation is supposed to establish a policy environment 
that sustains market incentives and investor confidence; therefore, the regulator should be 
free from political interference, consistent and accountable. Independent regulation can 
provide assurance to foreign investors that their profits and output will not be politically 
manipulated.119 
 
There is recognition that the rapid changes in globalization for developing countries have 
both positive and negative implications and some analysts argue that it is the role of the 
international regulation through a multilateral agreement on investment to ensure that the 
economic benefits are maximized while the social and environmental standards remain 
unhampered. 
 
The MAI is strongly marketed within African countries as the only way in which African 
countries can reach their desired expectations of attracting FDI. The support of MAI will 
increase investor confidence about Africa’s determination to do what it takes to attract 
FDI.120 
Okere refers to this type of FDI as a ‘rose-tainted’ type of FDI which he advises 
developing countries especially in Africa, to avoid, and says that, the usefulness of FDI 
depends on the way it is regulated. 
 
In the next section of this chapter, the implications of the proposed MAI are discussed 
extensively. The proposal for a MAI may not be a bad idea as a whole, but the 
participants need to act very keen and balance the needs of the host country and those of 
the investors. 
                                                 
117Maria Pigatto (n.166 above) 38.  
118 Collin and Others(n.107 above) 15 
119 UNCTAD, 2006. 
120 Charles Okere. MIA and Africa’s foreign direct investment; The proposed multilateral investment 
agreement and Africa’s desire for foreign direct investments. 
Third world network, Accra online, http://www.aidc.org visited on 24 September 2007. 
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3.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED MAI COMING INTO EFFECT 
 
3.2.I INTRODUCTION  
The OECD attempt to propose a multilateral agreement on investment in 1998 provides 
an important case to examine the process of internationalization of a state. In fact, the 
suspension of negotiations for a MAI indicates clearly how serious the conflict is against 
the transnational capitalist class.121 At the beginning of negotiations OECD members 
thought that negotiations would be complete within six months, which never happened. 
Some members now feel that it is time to start negotiations at the WTO, since it has more 
experience in implementing multilateral agreements and might succeed where the OECD 
has failed.122 Also the WTO has a bigger membership than the OECD; therefore the 
agreement would be part of the WTO commitments.123 
 
The fact that the OECD involved members of the same category, capitalists and those 
‘like-minded’, implied that it could not be trusted.124 The proposed MAI was more 
concerned with the interests of investors, their contractual and proprietary rights, and did 
not consider whether there was any actual inflow of money or resources.125 
To a larger extent, it was indeed a wise move to reject the OECD MAI because it was 
negotiated without serious involvement of the major stake holders. There was no 
consultation about the different clauses it contained and yet, it is the developing countries 
in the long run that would suffer the consequences. 
 
3.2.2 OUTSTANDING ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF MAI 
                                                 
121 Edward Graham. The transnational historic materialism sees the neo- liberal strategy of an emerging 
transnational capitalist class in defining internationalization in terms of a national state becoming a 
transmission belt for global capital; Trade and Investment at the WTO. Online 
www.iiecom/publications/chapters[accessed on 11 may 2007]. 
122‘ The talking FDI blues’ and ‘An investment treaty in trouble’. The Economist, 34. No.8059, 14/03/1998; 
18-19 and 81-82. 
123 OECD public documents. www.oecd.org. 
124 About 95.4% of multinational corporations are OECD members. There is no way the agreement could 
be drawn on fair grounds. 
125 Picciotto sol (1999): ‘A critical assessment of MAI. Regulating international business beyond 
liberalization’. Oxfam in Association with Macmillan 85. 
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The major exporters of capital are the ones behind the MAI. These are mainly the EU 
countries.126 The debate on the positive effects of MAI is a ‘hot’ issue amongst members 
and this accounts for the failure to come to a conclusion on the agreement. This section 
shall analyse some of the positive arguments for the MAI such as, policy coherence, 
growing importance of FDI, transparency, predictability and legal security, national 
legislation no alternative, competition for FDI, the need to move to a multilateral level, 
marginalization,  international policy spillovers and reduction of uncertainty. 
 
3.2.2.1 Policy coherence 
International agreements have been signed, which are either bilateral or regional to 
improve the investment environment in the signatory countries.127 A multilateral 
framework on investment would encourage policy coherence which in turn would 
promote FDI. 
The existence of bilateral and plurilateral agreements on investments has its short- 
comings. By June 1996 a total of 1166 agreements had been signed,128 and this is  
problematic since different agreements have different coverage of issues and rules. The 
more the agreements, the higher the risk of having inconsistent rules,129 which is a big 
impediment to FDI. The risk is seen by even those who are against MAI but have a 
preference to go bilateral or regional.130  It would be prudent therefore, to be part of a 
single agreement with a defined set of rules, than being party to many which may conflict 
with each other and in the long run the desired goal of attracting FDI is not achieved. 
Policy coherence in international trade can contribute to an equitable and sustainable 
global development.131 
                                                 
126 These are the industrialized countries which are at the highest levels of development compared to those 
in developing countries an Africa. These countries have been joined however by some of the developing 
ones to come up with a multilateral investment agreement. 
127 These agreements include those signed between the developed and developing countries, as earlier on 
noted in chapter 2 above and also between countries at the same levels of development. 
128 WTO,1996. 
129 WTO,1996 has observed  that members would have to sign about 7503 agreements if they wished to 
provide investment protection through bilateral treaties of which is likely  to involve a lot of 
inconsistencies. 
130 UNCTAD, 1996. 
131 Nordic Africa, Tanzania. Online http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/i/pdf. [accessed on 27 May 2007]. 
 
 
 
 
 38
3.2.2.2 Growing importance of FDI 
 
Attraction of FDI is on the agenda for most developing countries. FDI is a form of 
international integration that brings gains to both parties according to the principles of 
comparative advantage.132 During 1986 to 1995 FDI outflow increased rapidly in world 
trade and its value multiplied more than twelve times.133 In many African countries, FDI 
is a major source of external finance. In 2002, developing countries had a net FDI reading 
of $143 billion.134 Benefits for the home country include market access and increased 
competition, as a result of an alliance between governments, whereas, for the host 
country, FDI creates an increase in jobs and wages, increased technology, organizational 
and managerial skills, market increase and a contribution to domestic savings and 
investments. There is a close link between FDI and trade because trade leads to FDI and 
FDI leads to trade.135  This has contributed greatly to poverty alleviation in Africa and 
other developing countries. 
 
3.2.2.3 Transparency, predictability and legal security 
 
Foreign investors need transparent and predictable rules, as well as legal security, in 
order to operate. Investors need to be sure of any corresponding returns in the form of 
compensation in case of a risk involved. This is however disadvantageous to the host 
country in attracting foreign direct investments. 
The MAI will provide transparency and predictable rules,136 and instill confidence in 
foreign investors since the rules are all the same. This is unlike the bilateral and regional 
agreements which at times contradict each other on certain principles of trade. 
 
                                                 
132Graham, Krugman 1995. International trade unlike FDI involves an arms length transaction while FDI 
deals with intrusive transactions.  
133 WTO, 1996. 
134 BBC. Africa best for investment. Online www.globalpolicy.org/sececon/develop/africa/2003. [aceesesd 
on 21 September 2007]. 
135 WTO, 1996. A Research by Centre D’etudes Prospectives et D’informations internationals in Paris. 
136 The supporters of MAI look at transparency and legal security as major considerations in attracting FDI. 
This may be unlike the bilateral or  regional agreements. Once the country has signed more than one 
agreement, it is foreseeable that its rules are likely to contradict because not all these agreements have 
similar provisions. 
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3.2.2.4 National security is no alternative 
LDCs are undergoing a process of policy liberalization which has affected the monitory 
infrastructure in these countries to attract inward FDI.137 The absence of an international 
agreement can have serious consequences for the flow of FDI. Different investors from 
different countries do not have similar rules on investment and this can affect foreign 
direct investments, especially on the principles of law. This may be worse for developing 
countries whose laws are not very developed. What investors need is the protection to do 
business. 
 
Where there is a difference in the laws of the host country and the home country, there 
requires to be an international institution for dispute settlement to solve disputes between 
investors and the host governments, or between the contracting states. The multilateral 
investment agreement would be the appropriate vehicle because it would create a balance 
between the laws and have its own dispute settlement system to handle international 
investment cases. 
 
3.2.2.5 Competition for FDI 
 
Economic nationalism in developing states has sought to control inward and outward 
investment flows; they have employed interventionist measures like protective tariffs and 
tax incentives,138 investment screening,139 and performance requirements.140 The global 
                                                 
137 Drabrek and Liarb, 1997. 
138 Out of the four states surveyed in the early 1990’s, only three did not provide some kind of incentives to 
foreign investment. 
UNCTAD, incentives and FDI flows, World investment report 1995. 
139 Investment screening refers to mechanisms that require prior approval for or prohibit entirely the 
establishment of FDI and such mechanisms are in the foreign investment codes.  
140 The case for investment incentives, screening and performance requirement are widely discussed in 
investment law. Investment incentives especially have called for a different approach amongst economists. 
While some countries offer these incentives, others do not regard them as having a significant impact on 
flows of FDI. Some argue that incentives should be shifted to be financial like co-financing e.g. under the 
EU rules as opposed to fiscal incentives such as tax holidays. Hungary ministry of finance, Budapest, 
September 2003. 
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environment for FDI increased in 2005.141 Corporate profitability was strong and low 
interest rates and equity valuation142 in most countries was firm. 
Some countries have imposed restrictions on outward investment to prevent a loss of 
capital. Developing countries have begun to encourage outward investment so as to gain 
access to foreign markets or needed assets such as natural resources, less expensive 
labour and technology.143 
 
The role of incentives in attracting FDI is criticized to be distortionary. Those who 
provide incentives get more and those that provide less or none at all are excluded. This 
has made competition for FDI more intense. Rich countries are providing better and 
attractive incentives which have led to increased marginalization of the poor and 
developing countries in Africa. 
FDI plays an increasingly important role in promoting world wide economic growth and 
development through stimulating markets, creating jobs, increasing wages and 
transferring technology and knowledge, it stimulates development and reduces 
poverty.144 FDI also contributes to growth in government revenue.145 
 
Considering the benefits and importance of FDI, it is better to globally regulate in order 
to maximize its benefits and increase its flow especially among the developing countries. 
 
3.2.2.6 Marginalization 
 
It is generally noted that poor countries attract less foreign investment compared to the 
rich and developed countries. Membership of the MAI will bolster the confidence of not 
                                                 
141 Hans Christiansen 2006: Trends and recent developments in FDI; International investment perspectives, 
2006. 
OECD 2006. 
142 Ibid, 32.  
 In the US, net FDI flows were $ 110 billion in 2005 up from the 18% decrease in 2004, FDI flows from 
Japan in the same year were 64 billion. This was considered a spectacular increase and even though Japan 
is reknowned as the world’s most important outward investor, its 2005 figure was the highest on record 
since 1990. 
143 Richard Caves. Multinational enterprises and economic analyst, 27, 31-34, 2nd ed, 1996. 
144 Business Rountable 2003. WTO policy working paper. How the WTO can promote the benefits of 
international investment. http://www.brtable.org/taskforces. [accessed on 17 September 2007]. 
145 Ibid pg 3. 
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only foreign, but also domestic, investors, by ensuring that the policy regime is unlikely 
to shift in the future due to the cost of withdrawal from a multilateral agreement of this 
type.146 For those unable to accede, it would provide a benchmark for evaluating the 
standards and quality of their investment regimes.147 
 
Due to the failure to conclude the MAI, there is a major shift from multilateralism to 
BITS,148 because investors seek opportunities in countries where they can best be 
protected. This has resulted in discrimination for those countries that are not party to 
these agreements.149 
Since the provisions under the BITS are not the same, it has led to conflicts between the 
parties. 
 
The above situation does not encourage foreign direct investments and is very 
discouraging as well to foreign investors.  In essence, it is right to argue that a MAI 
would therefore be a better option in attracting consistent and even distribution of FDI 
and ensure investor protection under a single binding rule. 
 
3..2.2.7 International policy spillovers 
 
There is skeptism that regulation of foreign investments may lead to negative spillovers 
and externalities at a global level leading to distortions in the allocation of investment, as 
well as co-ordination failures which result in inefficient results.150 
                                                 
146 FitzGerald and Cubero 1998: Development Implications of Multilateral Agreement on Investment; A 
report to the Department for International Development University of Oxford. 21.  
147 FitzGerald and Cubero(n.146 above) 12. 
148 UNCTAD, 2007. 
This is a major reason for replacing the BITS                                                                                                                             
with a multilateral framework because they have discriminated against those countries that cannot achieve 
those requirements. According to UNCTAD, 2007, BITS are a creation of the western capital exporting 
countries to protect investors and their investments abroad especially in developing countries to supplement 
domestic legal systems, so as to provide protection against many kinds of interference by host governments 
and discrimination against foreign investors and investments.                                                                                                  
150 Okhomina’ The Quest for MAI; Implications for developing countries’. 2005.                                                                               
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It is foreseeable that once investment regulation is done on an international basis, this 
may in turn increase the global flow of FDI. Such benefit may be achieved through 
accession to the MAI. 
 
3.2.2.8 Reducing uncertainty 
 
Firms may confront significant transaction costs and uncertainty resulting from 
differences in national rules and bilateral treaties. The MAI will act to address the 
concerns of developing countries. The fact that many developing countries have signed 
bilateral and plurilateral treaties with developed countries is likely to cause a lot of 
uncertainty amongst investors since the rules may be different in each agreement. 
 
According to Hoekman and Saggi, the MAI may act as a mechanism through which 
governments make irrevocable commitments and guarantees against policy reversals, 
thereby anchoring expectations of investors.151 Investors may avoid a country which has 
a frequency of policy reversals, or whose commitments to reversal are not deemed 
credible.152 
Nunnenkamp notes that, developing countries seem to be reluctant to buy the idea that 
their bargaining power would be stronger in a multilateral context than in the bilateral 
dealings with major industrialized countries.153 
 
Generally, there is a need to move to the multilateral level. Membership to the MAI is the 
best way developing countries can promote and encourage a long term productive capital 
formation by foreign and domestic firms that will support sustainable development. 
If developing countries committed themselves to an international regulatory regime, there 
is hope for achieving a substantial reduction in uncertainty which should lead to more and 
better investment by foreign, domestic and expatriate firms.154 
                                                 
151 Hoekman and Saggi. World Bank Development, May 1999. online www.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade 
[accessed on 28 August 2007].                                                                                                                                                               
152 Ferrani Berno 2003. A Multilateral Investment Framework: Would it be justifiable on economic welfare 
grounds? 2003. online http://www.wti.org [accessed 25 August 2007]. 
153 Peter Nunnenkamp and  Manoj Pant. Why the case for Multilateral Agreement on Investment is weak. 
March 2003. online. http://opus.zbw.kiel. 
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MAI would be in the best interest of African countries that need a well negotiated 
investment agreement which takes into account their developmental interests on a 
multilateral level. 
International organizations such as the EU and WTO have also advocated for a 
multilateral investment agreement to boost the flow of investments amongst countries. 
According to the EU, many countries have already liberalized their domestic investment 
regimes, having realized that this is the avenue for attracting more investments and for 
smaller countries, would be an avenue for access to larger markets.155 
 
It is further stated that, while the 1600 BITS cover investment protection, market opening 
rules on the admission of investment are confined to regional initiatives and even though 
the WTO rules cover some forms of investment under the GATS and address relevant 
issues on investment under the TRIMS,156 investment protection is not given attention. 
 
3.2.3 Arguments against the MAI: Why opposed 
 
With the grant of excessive protection and the grant of rights without corresponding 
obligations to the multinational corporations, developing countries feared the 
consequences this would have on their economies and their national development 
strategies. 
There were serious concerns of loss of state sovereignty, security concerns, 
environmental as well as labour threats and a lack of control over foreign direct 
investments. The MAI would give maximum protection to foreign investors and 
multinational corporations thus limiting the ability of developing states to regulate 
foreign investments. 
Developing countries and other WTO members have since insisted on further discussing 
the agreement especially as regards the modes of negotiation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
154 Fitzgerald (n.147 above) 4. 
155 Young Steven and Tavares 2004: Multilateral rules on FDI; Do we need them? Will we get them? A 
developing country perspective in UNCTAD 2004 Transnational corporations Vol. 13 UN publications.  
156 European Commission 1998: WTO New Round . Discussion paper. 
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3.2.3.1 Security considerations 
 
Investing in security would give governments discretion to allow or reject foreign 
investment security being an important sector of any economy that requires direct 
government control. The definition of security is not very clear. Drabek argues that, it is 
this ambiguity which gives each of the different states the discretion to define it their 
way.157 
Governments will play a leading role in the choice of foreign partners, and 
Privatization and foreign direct investment will give the black majority a 
greater share of the white dominated economy.158- Robert Mugabe, President of 
Zimbabwe 
Mugabe explains further that, ‘the role of the state is vital.’ The fact that the definition of 
security is left to the governments to decide, is perceived to be for the protection of some 
special interest groups.159 
 
If there is no common definition reached, this is likely to hinder the negotiations of MAI. 
When a government loses the ability to control its security issues to a foreign corporation, 
it in itself implies insecurity and this would be associated with loss of state 
sovereignty.160 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
157 Drabek Zdenek, ‘A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the skeptics.’ 1998. 
158 The citation is quoted from Grace Okhomina in ‘The quest for a multilateral Investment Agreement, 
2005. The quotation is cited from Financial Times, 5 March 1997, 7. 
159 Okhomina(n.158 above) 45. 
160 No country would allow its army or police institutions to be taken over by  a foreign corporation. Losing 
control due to globalization is a fear of many countries and governments. Governments reserve the right to 
pursue their political objectives and national priorities and generally attempt to restructure the countries 
political and other institutions in accordance with the demographic characteristics of society concerned 
(Drabek 1998). Governments also need to protect their cultures which would be destroyed by uncontrolled 
foreign domination as an intervention through globalizing investments. 
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3.2.3.2 Costs of globalisation 
 
The parties involved in the MAI view globalization as if it is a costless venture or 
procedure altogether.161  The adjustment costs seem to be more unbearable especially for 
developing African countries. As Drabek states some of the recent financial turmoil 
affecting capital and foreign exchange markets in Mexico, Argentina, the Czech Republic 
and Thailand, the whole idea of globalization has scared off developing countries since 
even the extent to which they are going to benefit from it is not clear. 
 
The question which remains is what net benefits will the MAI bring to them? MAI is 
likely to create development costs and not benefits for developing countries. The WTO 
members are not certain that the WTO will produce fair rules for developing countries  
and fear therefore that once the agreement is reached, it is going to have binding effects 
on them that will be very hard to change and which may result in greater marginalization 
of these countries. This therefore explains the position for the increased number of 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements signed between these countries. Bilateral agreements 
seem to be more protective of their interests than the multilateral investment agreement. 
 
3.2.3.3 Corporate practices 
 
Policies requiring companies to incorporate will be made invalid. The treaty will enforce 
more serious liberalization of finance with foreign banks and other institutions being 
given the right to operate.162 The argument against MAI is that it is likely to promote 
corporate malpractices in MNCs who are the major exporters of foreign investment.163 
                                                 
161 Adjustment costs have been ignored. There are also negative effects pointed out by some economists 
(Rodrik, 1997 ) that include; growing income inequality, poverty as well as marginalization of some 
countries. Adjustment costs therefore may scare off some countries from opening up their markets to 
investment globalization.  
162 Okhomina(n.159 above) 52. 
163 Drabek, 1998 states that corporate practices are used by MNCs to deprive host governments of fiscal 
resources thus leading to persistent dependence of those countries on MNCs. MNCs are taking advantage 
of globalization to get around environmental concerns and operating rules, for example labour conditions. 
Such practices are considered as unethical and dangerous to the development of poor African countries. 
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Practices like transfer pricing, have been commonly used as an example of how MNCs  
keep developing nations in a situation of dependence. 
 
Considering the signing of the agreement and all the consequences involved, like the 
binding nature and the excessive power it gives to multinational corporations, developing 
countries will be left in a more disadvantaged position. Following the signing of the MAI, 
policies favouring local firms will be cancelled and will heavily reduce their market share 
as well as preferential treatment. In fact when the worst comes, they may be forced to 
close down and this has multiple effects on the countries revenue. 
 
 
3.2.3.4 Preserving the status quo 
 
The basic argument against MAI is that host countries need to preserve their investment 
regulations and be free to make any adjustments in the interest of the country. 
 
According to UNCTAD, 1996, it was concluded that the current arrangements on FDI 
regulation are working well in enabling a framework that allows FDI to contribute to 
growth and development and supporting high standards and growing FDI flows.164 
It states that it is better to go both ways to regulate FDI through regional and bilateral 
approaches if countries are made to understand the real benefits of foreign investment. 
 
UNCTAD is accused of not supporting MAI, yet some critics think that it is a better 
institution to handle this matter because of the greater influence it has on different 
countries in the field of trade and investment. It clearly indicates that it is countries with a 
similar status that enter into this agreement, and that it is those that are highly 
industrialized that are pushing for this MAI because they have a common goal to achieve, 
like increasing their market access, ensuring accessibility to natural resources, and 
maximizing their profits. The ideas are very different from those of the FDI recipients 
who look at foreign investment as a “final touch” to all their developmental problems.  
                                                 
164 UNCTAD, 1996. 
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MNC’s are flexible and more experienced in operating diverse policy frameworks and 
can adapt to regulatory differences among countries and rule coherence through 
negotiating a global bilateral investment agreement.165 
 
3.2.3.5 Negotiation strategy 
 
Another argument against the MAI is that some countries lack negotiating support and 
others do not even understand the issues discussed in negotiations. Drabek166 the leading 
author on this subject, quotes the Commerce Secretary of Bangladesh as saying that, 
“In conferences, we cannot play a meaningful role and as a result our comparative 
advantages are undermined…..the least developing countries often do not know their 
obligations and rights under the world trading system.” 
 
Other countries are against the MAI because they do not understand the nature of the 
negotiations at all, they believe that their hands are tied and have already been burnt in 
the past.167 
 
Developing countries also have a preference to negotiate at regional levels because such 
agreements are not unilaterally binding and also considering the process of dispute 
settlement, they are comfortable with the bilateral system of regulating investments. 
Developing countries are still divided among themselves on whether they should 
cooperate towards a multilateral agreement.168 
                                                 
165 UNCTAD is very sensitive about about the plight of developing countries once they sign the multilateral 
investment agreement. There is skeptism about the honesty of MNCs and the rules governing foreign 
investment. Some members have more faith in UNCTAD which strongly believes that negotiations should 
take a completely bilateral direction. 
Drabek argues that, allowing countries and regions to develop their own approaches fosters policy 
competition which leads to a relatively rapid spread of best practices of FDI. 
166 Drabek(n.163 above)13 
167 Martin Knor, Third world net work. Developing countries should not be coerced into Investment 
negotiations. He quotes the Indian minister of Trade who advised developing countries not to take part in 
the WTO negotiations on the multilateral Investment Agreement unless they are fully convinced it is in 
their interest. One of the delegates commented that they started negotiations before knowing before hand 
what the elements and obligations entailed and that it was very important to know the substance and the 
path before deciding on whether to negotiate. 
Online http://www.twnside.org.sg/tittle/twninfo17.htm. [accessed on 27/08/2007].  
168 Seid, Sherif H 2002, Global regulation of foreign direct investments, Ashgate publishing, pg 99.  
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3.2.3.6 Mechanism of global negotiations 
 
The mechanism of negotiations is inefficient. It takes such a long time before conclusions 
are reached. In the case of bilateral negotiations, they seem to be faster and easier than 
multilateral treaties. Prolonged negotiations result in further delays of FDI.169 The fear of 
developing countries is that the negotiations are driven by the world’s wealthiest 
economies, and therefore it’s their priorities which matter.  The concerns of labour 
mobility, environment, and transfer of technology, would not receive adequate 
attention.170 Developing countries are avoiding a situation where they will adopt strong 
liberalization measures too fast. However, according to Graham 1996, the agreement will 
be drafted with exceptions, especially in favour of developing countries who in most 
cases need more time, but not on the nature of the obligations. Negotiations at the WTO 
bind all members; so when a member fails to agree in negotiations, it may leave and lose 
all the benefits under the institution which has still instilled fear among WTO developing 
country members in Africa. 
 
3.2.3.7 Decapitalisation and denationalisation 
 
Increased growth of economic integration and interdependence has exposed the 
limitations of the classic liberal internationalist system based on national sovereignty.171 
Decapitalisation and denationalization are causes of impoverishment in LDCs in Africa 
and other developing countries. The effect of such globalization is that it leads to 
marginalization of these regions, and also accounts for the income disparities.172 
                                                 
169 Developing countries are more interested in discussions on textiles and agriculture because tis s the base 
of their economies. This could be the reason why they have little interest in the MAI negotiations. 
Although the commitment to the negotiations by the like minded people are faster and stronger, there is a 
risk for LDC’s that multilateral negotiations could be dominated by the agenda of the strongest economies. 
There is a fear therefore of adopting too strong liberalization rules too soon and fast. 
170 UNCTAD,1996 168. 
171 Sol piccitto, Networks in International Economic Integration. Fragmented states and the dilemmas of 
neo-liberalism. 17.J. INT’L Law & Business, 1014. 
172 Woodward, 1996. 
FDI leads to decapitalisation of host countries as well as denationalization especially given the fact that 
they do not have the economic power to compete with the already strong and established MNCs. The fear 
of host countries of losing economic control through globalisation poses a serious threat to the finalizing of 
the multilateral negotiations on investments.  
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While some developing countries have benefited, African and other LDC’s have been 
harmed; which means that the effects of globalization have not been fully spread. The 
excessive domination of MNCs under the MAI poses the threat of economies being 
dominated by the powerful countries with rights given to them without any obligations 
which may result in environmental degradation and human rights violation. 
 
The 1998 OECD draft agreement could encourage a situation where private companies 
would sue governments under international law for regulatory undertakings and whether 
this should be compensated is still an issue of concern. 
It should be made clear under the MAI that the sovereignty of the state is preserved and 
the right of the governments to regulate the activities of MNCs is reserved. 
 
3.2.3.8 Implications of FDI 
 
The advocates of the multilateral investment agreement argue strongly that the agreement 
will increase the flow of FDI into the host countries together with its benefits. FDI 
promotes the countries capital as well as investment stocks but the effect still remains that 
the returns from such investments are repatriated by the foreign investors.173 
 
Developing countries need to first be sure that FDI is beneficial to both the host and 
home countries. Considering the domestic sectors, they may be overwhelmed by foreign 
investment and may result in them being eliminated completely from the investment 
scene. 
It is quite clear as earlier mentioned in chapter one, that the needs of foreign investors 
and those of the host countries are different. This creates problems in clearly 
understanding the importance of foreign direct investment especially to the host 
countries. 
 
                                                 
173 Bhagirath Las Das. A critical Analysis of the Proposed Investment Treaty in the WTO  
July 2003. WtroubleO. 
Such benefits that are likely to be repatriated include; dividends, profits, fees, management expenses. 
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Investors aim at using cheap labour and reducing the cost of production as well as easy 
access to raw materials while host countries focus on improving their market access, 
technology, job opportunities, increased government revenue and infrastructure, to 
mention but a few. 
 
3.2.4. An overview of the TRIMS and the GATS as measures for investment in 
WTO 
 
Having failed to conclude negotiations at the OECD, some members agreed to start 
negotiations at the WTO.174 Edward Graham argues that negotiations at the WTO may 
succeed since it has more members and this would imply a very strong commitment to 
the agreement.175 
 
The Agreement on Trade- Related Investment measures, (TRIMS) establishes rules on 
certain investment measures which restrict and distort trade.176 The Agreement has 
however raised more questions than can be answered regarding its significance to 
developing the multilateral trading system and the WTO. 
A number of issues led to the inclusion of investment in the working program of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Such concerns included the changing role of FDI in development and an intense debate 
on the linkage between the GATT rules and foreign investment policy arising out of the 
                                                 
148 The talking FDI blues and An Investment Treaty in Trouble: The economist 346, no. 8059. 14 March 
1998; 18-19 and 81-19. 
 At the December 1996 ministerial meeting of the WTO, nations authorized the creation of a working group 
on Trade and Investment. Several other members rejected the idea indicating that no formal negotiations 
should be begun until the completion of negotiations at the OECD to create a multilateral agreement on 
investment. The motive of the OECD members was that, the small OECD membership of like-minded, 
nations would be able to quickly craft a ‘ state of art’ investment agreement containing high standards. 
At the time of the WTO meeting, the OECD members expected that the MAI could be concluded in six 
months so as to be adopted at the 1997 OECD ministerial meeting which never happened. This was 
impossible due to the unfinished issues among members negotiating. Some have suggested that 
negotiations start at the WTO. 
175 Edward Graham. Trade and Investment at the WTO; Just Do IT. Online 
http://www.iie.com/publication/chpt. 
176 Preamble TRIMS, 2002. WTO Legal texts. WTO secretariat, 143. 
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US-Canada dispute on Canada’s application of performance measures to foreign 
investment.177 
 
The TRIMS has succeeded in applying the GATT, Article 111.4 on NT and quantitative 
restrictions. 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in services (GATS) is seen as the next potential 
multilateral agreement on investment.  The Agreement has however met with several 
objections especially at the effect it would have on people’s lives.178 
The GATS aims to further liberalise services in the public domain with private businesses 
providing public services. The main concerns of the GATS is to have a concentrated 
ownership, foreign ownership by large MNCs and rules limiting the ability of national 
governments to approximately hold companies providing these services accountable.179 
 
Both Agreements have faced criticism. The TRIMS does not explain the meaning of 
some crucial wordings in it. It does not explain the meaning of ‘trade –related investment 
measures’, although it has a conclusive list of measures that are inconsistent with the 
GATT provisions.180 The Agreement covers trade in goods only.181 
The Agreement becomes an inadequate regulation on a multilateral level since it does not 
cover services and movement of capital, which are considered a major part of FDI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
177 Bijit Bora. Development, Trade and the WTO. Trade-Related Investment Measures, 19. 
178 Anup Shah. General Agreement on Trade on services; Free Trade and Globalisation. July 24, 2001. 
online http://www.globalissues.org. 
179 Global issues. www.global issues.org 
180 Bijit, op cit pg171 
181 Art 1. TRIMS.  WTO Legal Texts WTO secretariat pg 143 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Africa’s investment strategies and economic freedom 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Africa’s trade and investment strategies and economic freedom 
through the AU and NEPAD frameworks. It further looks at Africa’s economic 
integration and the process of achieving economic freedom through trade and investment 
strategies.  
  
4.1.1 African Union (AU); New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
 
NEPAD is a Programme under the African Union created by Africans, for Africans and 
implemented by Africans,182 to strengthen development in terms of trade and investment 
on the African continent.  It was adopted at the 37th session of the assembly of the heads 
of state and government in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia. The assembly also introduced 
the Nepad heads of state and government implementation committee which provides 
leadership to Nepad process as well as setting priorities and the program of action. It is 
further meant to develop trade values and monitor their implementation within the 
framework of the African Union.183 There is however no unified investment strategy 
when it comes to FDI in Africa, although FDI trends have had a negative impact on the 
continent, and there is a need to design an investment strategy to ensure proper regulation 
of investments and also establish how best Africa can benefit from FDI flows. 
 
More emphasis has been put on NEPAD, the African Union and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism in order to establish a joint investment strategy for Africa to specifically 
solve the problems facing it in general, for instance, disease, unemployment and poverty 
which can only be overcome by creating financial sources specifically through FDI and 
empowering the Africans to manage their natural resources as are the basis of their 
economy. 
 
                                                 
182 NEPAD 2001: www.nepad.org [accessed on 4 July 2007]. 
183 NEPAD (n 182 above) 6. 
 
 
 
 
 53
The AU has replaced the Organisation for African Unity (OAU); its constitutive Act was 
adopted in July 2000. The major objectives of the OAU were to rid Africa of the 
remaining huddles of colonization and apartheid, promote unity and solidarity among 
African states, coordinate and intensify corporation for development, safeguard 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states as well as promote international 
corporation within the framework of the UN.184 Hilfiger185 says that, it has similar 
institutions to that of the EU and the AU. Unlike the OAU, it has a comprehensive plan 
of action which includes having accelerated political and socio-economic integration.186 
Although the Act does not give guidelines on attainment of foreign direct investment, it 
creates certain institutions to handle FDI. It states,187 
 
           We heads of state and government of member states of the OAU are convinced 
          of the need to accelerate the process of implementing the treaty establishing the 
          African Economic Community in order to promote the socio-economic  
         development of Africa, and to face the challenges posed by globalization. 
 
NEPAD is a holistic, integrated sustainable development initiative for the economic and 
social revival of Africa involving a constructive partnership between Africa and the 
developed world.188 It’s a pledge by African leaders based on a common vision and a 
firm and shared conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty, promote 
trade and investment and place their countries both individually and collectively on a 
path of sustainable growth and development through active participation in the world 
economy.189 
 
                                                 
184 Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of  South Africa 2003: African Union in a nutshell. Online 
http:// www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad.[ accessed on 7 November 2007]. 
185 Hilflinger, Marcus.2002: False hopes for an African Union- conditions for Integration Lacking- Die 
WZZ – Folio – Box Jestyt Bestellen. Dienstag. 20 August. 
186 Constitutive Act; art 3. 
187 Ibid, constitutive Act 1-2. 
188 Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu, 2005; Former CEO of the Nepad Secretariat: What is the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa Development? Online http://www.corporateafrica.com/ca/forward.[ accessed on 7 
November 2007]. 
189 Nkuhlu Wiseman (n. 188 above) same page. 
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The initiative is based on the determination of Africans to rid themselves and the 
continent of Africa from the dangers of underdevelopment and exclusion in the global 
economy.190 NEPAD191  offers opportunities for the advanced countries of the world to 
enter into genuine partnership with Africa on grounds of mutual interests and benefit, 
shared commitment and binding agreements provided by the African leadership. Also in 
proposing NEPAD, Africa realized how much control it has in holding the key to its own 
success and development.192 In adopting a concrete development strategy together with a 
detailed programme of action marks the birth of new opportunities in the partnership and 
increased co-operation between Africa and the developed world. 
 
4.1.2 Trade and market access 
 
NEPAD highlights the need for African governments, the private sector and other 
institutions of civil society to commit to the genuine integration of all nations into the 
global economy to enhance trade and market access.193 
 
The potential for trade to help Africa become integrated in the international economy is 
no longer an issue of debate, but more of action.194 Moving from Africa’s capitals to 
western capitals, there is consensus that if Africa is to overcome its development 
challenges, trade is a key player that will make this happen. The international 
commitment at high political levels to making trade work for Africa in its endeavor to lift 
its millions out of poverty is also not in doubt.195 
 
                                                 
190 Professor Nkuhlu ( n. 189 above) 2. 
191 The founding document of the NEPAD contains both a strategic policy framework and Programme of 
action. 
192 See details of the  principles underpinning NEPAD; Smunda S Mokoena (2003), African Peer Review 
Mechanism, Presentation at 4th Pan African Conference of Ministers of Public Service, Stellenbosch, South 
Africa; NEPAD . 
193 See World Trade Organization (WTO); Support to NEPAD Period Report 2004-2005. 
www.un.org/africa/osaa [accessed on 28 July 2007]. 
194 Firmino G Mucavele (2001); Industry development, Trade and Market Access: the NEPAD agenda, 
www.unido.org [accessed on 28 July 2007]. 
195 This is in line with NEPAD’s primary objective of accelerating the eradication of poverty and inequality 
between Africa and the developed world.   
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Further more, political efforts have been boosted in areas where trade has featured 
prominently and this can be traced to the millennium summit in 2000 of world leaders 
and the formulation of the Millennium Development Goal 8.196 
World leaders have also committed themselves to creating a multilateral trading system 
that is both fair and equitable in order to accommodate trade challenges. The commitment 
was expressed in a more concrete and solid manner through the Doha mandate ministerial 
conference in Qatar in November 2001.197 
Professor Mucavele,198 states further that financial access may be considered as a major 
challenge, where many investment projects from the formal sector and SMEs continue to 
be affected by a lack of financial products necessary to their needs. 
 
 
 
4.2. Trade opportunities 
 
4.2.1 Preferential trade agreements for Africa 
 
Although over the last three decades Sub- Saharan Africa has been a beneficiary of 
preferential market access offered by most developed countries, for example preferential 
agreements have long existed between the EU and the African Caribean and Pacific 
countries, ACP such relationships are governed by the cotonou partnership agreement 
which came into force in 2000 in place of the Lome convention.199 Since the cotonou is a 
                                                 
196 MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development: The enormous gaps between the potential 
realization of trade development and the actual attainment in this area, and increased awareness of the lack 
of capacity of some states to emerge from misery without more and better assistance have led to a global 
determination to broaden and deepen international co-operation. This aims at developing further an open 
trading and financial system that is law based, predictable and non- discriminatory. www.un.org [accessed 
on 3 August 2007]. 
197 Firmino G Mucavele (2001), op.cit : In line with the MDG’s, concrete commitment towards more 
equitable co-operation has been re-iterated on several occasions. In 2001 the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
committed to make the interests of poor countries central to the future work of trade ministers and pledged 
itself to duty free, quota free, market access for products from LDC’s. 
198 Professor  Mucavele (n.197 above) 3. 
199 Catherine Grant 2006; Southern Africa and the European Union: the TDCA and SADC EPA. Online 
http://www.trilac.org/pdf [accessed on 7 November 2007]. 
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preferential agreement, it has been criticized by some WTO members for not being in 
line with Article xxiv of the GATT, 1947. 
Grant further explains that,200 economic partnership agreements between the EU and 
ACP countries will be negotiated and be made compatible with the WTO. The major 
principles under the cotonou for the economic partnership agreements include; 
reciprocity, differentiation, deeper regional integration and coordination of trade.201 
 Developed countries have thus provided preferential market access through the Cotonou 
Agreement and recently the EU’s ”Every Thing but Arms” initiative and the United States 
Africa’s Growth  and Opportunities Act (AGOA).202 The continent has not however been 
able to exploit this access to improve its trade performance, and a major part of the 
reasons for this has to do with supply side constraints and a range of problems with those 
preferential arrangements have combined to severely diminish the realization of potential 
benefits.203 South Africa for instance participates in a number of preferential trade 
relations which are both regional and bilateral and is also a founding member of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 1947 as well as active in the WTO.204 
 
These problems include limited security of access, inadequate product coverage, and low 
utilization due to stringent attached conditions, insufficient preference margins, quota 
restrictions and administrative red tape, among others.205 These factors discourage 
exporters from utilizing preference schemes because compliance costs and uncertainty 
outweigh the value of the preferential margin making the preferences not commercially 
meaningful.206 
 
Subsequently, due to the non discrimination principle of Most- Favored Nation (MFN) 
tariff rates continue to apply to an estimated half to three quarters of exports from Africa 
                                                 
200 Grant (n. 199 above) 5 
201 Grant (n.200 above) 5 
202 See www.ictsd.org/weekly [accessed on 23 July 2007]. 
203 See Potential Partnerships for African Recovery Programme (2001), A market access action Plan for 
Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa, 4. 
204 South African trade relationships. Online http://www.sa.info/doing-business, [accessed on 7 November 
2007]. 
205 See www,ictsd.org/weekly [accessed 23 July 2007]. 
206 ICSTD (n. 205 above) 8 
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and other Least Developed Countries (LDC’s) in the major markets.207 Rules of origin in 
preferential agreements are an independent trade policy instrument regulating market 
access as much as tariff concessions and are largely responsible for the nullification of 
the trade preferences and application of the MFN rate for at least three quarters of LDC 
exports.208 
 
 
4.2.2 Africa’s participation in the World Trade Organization 
 
Africa has not been an active player in global trade liberalization initiatives for most of 
the half century of the history of the world trade system now based on the WTO.209 The 
share of developing countries generally increased to about 25% in recent years,210 but the 
share of African countries has stagnated, for instance in 2001, its share amounted to less 
than 3% compared to 5% in 1980. 
The economic gains in certain areas such as, FDI to Africa was heavily concentrated in 
oil exporting countries and South Africa.211 Although Africa was involved in the GATT 
negotiations, they viewed the multilateral trading system with a lot of skepticism and 
concentrated on the especial and differential treatment through out the negotiations, and 
yet they seem to have achieved little economic progress which has been attributed to 
Africa’s insistence on non- reciprocity of trade concessions, whereas, African countries 
insist that it is the lack of faithful implementation of the Uruguay round agreements.212 
 
It is thus necessary to assess how the WTO agreements which are of importance to 
African countries such as agriculture address their major concerns, for instance on 
commodity dependency and subsidies. The marginalization of Africa countries has been 
mainly because of the special exception for developing countries under GATT rules in 
                                                 
207 ICTSD (n.205 above) 8. 
208 ICTSD (n. 207 above )  17. 
209 See www.un.org/africa/osaa, for details on WTO’s periodic Support to NEPAD’s trade initiatives. 
[Accessed 2 August 2007]. 
210 ICTSD Round table 2004; What is Africa’s Role in the Multilateral Trading System? Geneva, WTO, 
Concept paper and Program. Online http://www.ictsd.org/dialogue/2004 [accessed on 7 November 2007]. 
211 ICTSD (n.210 above) 2 
212 ICTSD (n.211 above)2 
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terms of which Africa is exempted from market access confessions especially with the 
industrialized countries.213 The opportunity for Africa is to develop a global trading 
environment through the NEPAD framework in order to attain its development goals. 
 
4.2.3 Strengthening regional integration arrangements in Africa. 
 
There continues to be strong interest in regional integration arrangements among African 
countries.214 Many view them as vehicles to support their economic growth, development 
as well as and industrial objectives. A major concern for Africa is to overcome 
constraints associated with small domestic markets which are characteristic in Africa. 
However, successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and the various preferential 
schemes in favour of Africa have reduced tariff barriers against most African exports to 
insignificant levels which is likely to have a bearing on efforts to redirect patterns of 
trade to boost intra- African regional trade.215 
 
Further more, regional trade initiatives may actually create trade rather than divert it,216 
but the main concern is more based on the extent of trade creation and its nature, there 
fore it is more likely that successful economic integration initiatives will depend upon 
successful implementation of trade and industrial policies.217 A major part of this will 
involve accelerating and deepening the various ongoing regional integration projects on 
the continent.218 This will require new innovative approaches based on interpretation of 
the major principles and a consideration of how WTO rules would restrict or facilitate 
Africa’s efforts in this regard. 
 
                                                 
213 The Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program, op cit 5.  
214 This is in tandem with NEPAD’s primary underpinning of accelerating and deepening regional and 
continental economic integration. 
215 View details of regional trade initiatives on www.afrodad.org/downloads/nepad. [accessed on 2 August 
2007]. 
216 The Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme, op.cit. 6. 
217 This is according to the Labor Resource and Research Institute (LRRI) research papers on NEPAD and 
Trade, see www.larri.com.na/papers/nepad/trade.[ accessed on 7 August 2007].  
218 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), COMESA (Common Markets for Eastern 
and Southern Africa), CEAC (Community of States of Central Africa), SADC (Southern African 
Community), WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) and EAC (East African 
Community). 
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4.2.4 Trade policy in Africa 
 
Trade policy in Africa will play a major but increasingly contested role as both domestic 
and foreign constituencies take a heightened interest in the extent of openness or 
protection of African economies and markets.219 The challenge for trade policy in Africa 
is the role it will play in adopting the continent’s economies to a highly competitive 
global environment in which success depends on the utilization of new technologies and 
production processes to increase efficiency.220 
Though subject to tensions between economics and politics, and differences in scope and 
intensity, trade policies in African countries have followed a discernible trend 
characterized by the prevalence of restrictions on trade and which seem to complicate the 
process towards freer trade.221 
 
In order to benefit from globalization and increase trade and investment flows, African 
countries need to adopt supply side and market access strategies,222 aimed at long term 
development and exploitation of the continents comparative advantage, based on adding 
value to a natural resources, including through harnessing knowledge and FDI.223 This 
requires main- streaming trade policy into comprehensive and integrated development 
strategies, incorporating appropriate macro-economic policies and the development of a 
stable and transparent regulatory environment.224 This involves strengthening the 
capacity of the state in African countries to understand and facilitate these changes. 
 
Also in order to improve the infrastructure for trade in the broadest sense are a critical 
element of the required trade interactions in Africa to enable exporters and importers to 
                                                 
219 Labor Resource and Research Institute. 13. 
220 LRRI (n.219 above). 
221 Soludo and Osita 2005: The politics of Trade Policy in Africa; International Development Research 
center, document 5. online http://www.idrc.ca/en/html [ accessed on 7 November 2007]. 
222 See Proposals on the role of trade in the NEPAD framework and NEPAD’s support of trade 
liberalization vis a vis globalization at www.transcend.org/t_database/pdfarticles. [Accessed on 7 August 
2007]. 
223 NEPAD (n,  above). 
224 See UNCTAD 2002.  
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take advantage of open markets. Subsequently a range of complimentary domestic 
policies are necessary such as those to protect vulnerable social groups, to expand 
alternative revenue sources and the provisions of education, training and health.225 
 
4.3 The challenges to Africa’s trade prospects 
 
The African continent continues to be marginalised by the massive growth of world trade 
over the last half century, in contrast to other developed and developing regions where 
trade has fuelled growth and development.226 Some of these challenges exist within 
countries, for instance political instabilities, corruption and lack of skills whereas some 
are far fetched from the world trading system as will be discussed below; 
 
4.3.1 The causes of Africa’s weak trade performance 
 
Africa is faced with a prolonged trend of weak trade performance which reflects the 
combined effects of deep long term structural constraints in many economies of Africa 
and adverse features in the international trade regimes which affect Africa’s exports.227 
The protectionist policies in key international markets have affected the products in 
which Africa specialises especially agricultural products thus constraining the continent 
from taking advantage of the benefits of world trade. 
 
4.3.2 Supply Side constraints 
 
According to the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme, (PARP) 228 
the combination of macro-economic imbalances, lack of human and physical capital, 
poorly developed infrastructure and economic governance institutions, an 
underdeveloped private sector and especially small and medium enterprises, constitute 
                                                 
225 See www.un.org/africa. Visited on 23 July 2007.  
226 UN (n.210 above) 20. 
227 The Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme, op.cit, 2. 
228 PARP (n.212 above) 4. 
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the key impediment to Africa’s participation in world trade and the new global growth 
dynamic based on new technologies and increased investment flows.229 
 
These factors have weakened the supply response of African economies to existing and 
new international market access opportunities. Also the decline of Africa’s share of world 
trade has coincided with the remarkable opening of international markets for the 
continent through preferential market access granted to Africa under the many  schemes 
put forward by the major industrial countries , as well as the series of rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT (1947), now the WTO.230 At the same 
time African countries have entered into various intra- continental regional trade and co-
operation arrangements through BITs and FTAs, although these have not sufficiently 
increased trade flows on the continent. 
 
In addition to the above is the narrow supply base for exports in many African countries 
due to their characteristic reliance on a few low value- added economic activities, 
typically in agriculture and mining.231 Conversely the industrial sector is small and often 
inefficient, narrow production specialization has rendered African countries vulnerable to 
external shocks and has limited their scope for economic growth.232 
 
Further more, from the 1960’s until the early 1980’s, African countries pursued inward 
looking trade policies with a typical anti- export bias, limiting the contribution of 
international trade to the continent’s development prospects.233 
 
Nonetheless, since the 1980’s the external trade sector has assumed new importance as 
many African governments, either unilaterally or through IMF and World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (Washington Consensus Paradigm),234 began 
reforming their trade regimes towards greater openness and export- orientation. However, 
                                                 
229 PARP (n.212 above) 4. 
230 Harnessing trade for development: Benefiting from Market Access Opportunities (2005), www.id21.org 
[accessed on 21August 2007].  
231 World Bank 2003. www.world bank.org [accessed on 21 August 200]. 
232 World Bank (n. 217 above) same page. 
233 World Bank 2004: www.worldbank.org [accessed on 21August 2007].  
234 World Bank (n. 233 above). 
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past trade liberalization efforts in Africa have been characterized by frequent policy 
reversals, not least because these programmes were externally imposed and lacked 
national ownership and outlook.235 
 
4.3.3 Market access constraints 
 
With regard to the many constraints to the growth of trade in Africa, they have been 
reinforced by certain characteristics of the external market access conditions faced by the 
continent and developing countries in general. A general feature of the market access 
available to Africa is its concentration in low value added sectors and its restrictiveness in 
high value added activities with the greatest potential of widening opportunities in 
investment and employment as well as sustaining economic growth.236 In addition, the 
fact that Africa relies more on unfinished goods or raw materials also limits its access to 
external markets which prefer manufactured products. 
 
In particular, low average tariffs have masked high tariff peaks and tariff escalation in 
industrial economies, specifically in areas of export interest to Africa and other 
developing countries.237  UNCTAD further states that, tariff peaks are frequent for 
agricultural products that are generally considered to offer potential for export 
diversification. Despite preferential market access granted to many African countries, 
competition is severely restricted by massive domestic support of agriculture in 
industrialized countries. Moreover, export subsidiaries distort international markets, 
depress prices and drive otherwise competitive agricultural productions in Africa out of 
the market.238 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
235 World Bank (n. 235 above) 10 
236 UNCTAD 2002 
237 UNCTAD (n. 236 above) 4 
238 See the justification for the Doha round, www.id21.org [accessed on 21 August 2007]. 
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4.4 NEPAD’s weakness 
 
According to Herbert Jauch,239 NEPAD’s section on the promotion of Africa’s exports 
doesn’t provide a critical analysis of the current problems that global trade causes for 
development on the continent. Instead NEPAD merely wants to promote African exports 
through improved procedures, market mechanisms, the tackling of trade barriers and 
skill-shortages, increased intra-regional trade, publicity for African goods and an 
improved image of Africa. At international level it proposes negotiations for access to 
world markets, encouragement of FDI, capacity building in the private sector and active 
participation of African heads of state in the world trading system under the auspices of 
the WTO; 240 
 
“NEPAD wants developing countries to benefit from those industries in which they have 
a natural competitive advantage and calls for diversification. African states have an 
existing or potential competitive advantage. This compromises value added industrial 
production for trade.” 
 
  The fact that Africa encourages more imports than exports, NEPAD notes that Africa 
offers a wide and growing market for producers across the world. A developing Africa 
with increased numbers of employed and skilled workers and a burgeoning middle class 
would constitute an expanding market for world manufactured products, intermediate 
goods and services NEPAD thus regards trade and investment as a key area for African 
development and accepts economic liberalization as the strategy to achieve the 
continent’s development goals and is thus problematic on the following counts;241 
Opening up to global competition in the provision of goods and services for African 
countries is likely to prevent the promotion of intra- African trade. 
                                                 
239 Herbert Jauch 2005: NEPAD and Trade, Labor Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI), 
www.larri.com.na .  
240 Herbert Jauch (n. 239 above) 7 
241 NEPAD 2002 
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Inter- regional trade liberalization in Africa will benefit the stronger economies in 
Africa while holding little benefit for the weaker ones. 
Africa’s development problems cannot be solved through trade although increased 
market access for African goods and services may be a useful initiative. This will 
however require the abolition or reduction of protectionist barriers which exist in 
various forms in industrialized countries.242 They undermine market access for 
African goods but NEPAD does not mention them. 
The implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements has shown that multilateral 
trade agreements tend to be biased towards the interests of the most industrialized 
countries at the expense of the needs and the interests of the developing countries. 
Global trade rules favour industrialized countries and a review of these rules at WTO 
level has consistently been blocked by the powerful WTO members whose corporate 
interests dominate the WTO agenda but NEPAD is silent on these issues. 
NEPAD does not mention the issue of capital flight, or the net export of capital that 
some African countries experience, and the risks posed by the liberalisation of the 
financial markets. These factors increase the vulnerability of national economies as 
shown in many parts of the world. 
 
In conclusion, NEPAD has also failed to provide an adequate analysis of the impact of 
global trade on Africa’s development prospects and thus fails to acknowledge the illusion 
that globalization and increased participation in the global economy will automatically 
lead to the continent’s recovery.243 Even some UN agencies like UNDP and UNCTAD 
have long acknowledged the polarizing impact of globalization which has driven Africa 
deeper into poverty.244 As Dot Kent,245  pointed out in a recent critique of NEPAD, 
 
                                                 
242 NEPAD (n.241 above) 12 
243 Vale, Peter 2002: NEPAD; Fiction of Fantasy? Senior Professor at the School of Government and 
Professor of Social Theory. University of the Western Cape. 
244 UNCTAD 2002. 
245 Kent Dot (2003), NEPAD and the African Union; New Agenda, Issue 9, First Quarter. 
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“The most fundamental problem for Africa is not its exclusion but rather the long     
standing, subordinate and exploitative nature of its inclusion into a profoundly 
asymmetrical international economy” (2003) 
 
Unless this fundamental problem is addressed, NEPAD’s hopes of achieving 
development through international trade and investment hold little prospects for the 
continent of Africa. 
 
4.5 Strengthening Africa’s participation in International Trade and the World 
Trade System 
 
It is the responsibility of African governments to address the challenges mentioned above 
and this calls for comprehensive and integrated national development strategies in which 
trade policy and market access will play a vital role in sustaining the continent’s 
economic growth through institutions like NEPAD. 
 
The increased openness of international markets and heightened economic 
interdependence in the world present an opportunity for Africa to be part of the dynamic 
growth of global trade and investment, both as an exporter and importer of goods and 
services. 
 
4.5.1     Creating a Market Access Action Plan for Africa 
 
An effective trade policy for Africa will foster structural adjustment and reform of the 
domestic economy to improve competitiveness and develop supply capacity.246 The 
question of how trade policy- making can contribute to enhanced capacity through 
properly phased and sequenced liberalization, also needs to recognize the importance of 
an enabling regulatory regime [legal frame work, competitive policy, investment 
policy….] within this context and that negotiation and participation in the WTO can be a 
                                                 
246 Catherine Grant (n. 199  above) 8 
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positive complement thereto.247 Participation in the WTO increasingly posses challenges 
and proactive trade policies as an integral part of national long-term development 
strategies. 
 
4.5.2 Improving preferential trading arrangements for Africa 
 
There is considerable scope to improve the benefits of preferential schemes for Africa, 
other developing countries, and LDC’s. In addressing the problems in the design and 
application of existing preferential arrangements could form a key part of a Market 
Access Action Plan for Africa (AAPA) in collaboration with other developing countries. 
Specific consideration as discussed by the AAPA needs to be given to the following 
elements:248 
 
Seeking the “binding” of preferential treatment under multilaterally agreed 
criteria to be adhered to by preference giving countries in the operation of their 
schemes. Accomplishment of this could be attained under the WTO for example 
under the Enabling Clause. 
 
Seeking the expansion of the scope of product coverage for duty free treatment 
for Africa and other LDC’s thus seeking to ease stringent rules of origin to match 
African and LDC industrial capacity, simplifying the detailed and ancillary origin 
criteria, direct consignment requirements, administration, documentation and 
verification which imply substantial additional costs and ensuring recognition of 
regional economic arrangement among developing countries. 
 
Ensuring that duty free access is not frustrated by other non-tariff measures, for 
example anti-dumping and safe guard measures, and eliminating non- trade 
conditionalities. 
 
                                                 
247 See WTO, www.wto.org, [accessed on 27 August 2007]. 
248 Catherine Grant (n.246  above) 8 
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Technical co-operation programmes to raise awareness of available preferences in 
LDCs and Africa, as well as to raise the level of understanding of the laws  and 
regulations that govern market access conditions, like quotas , and rules of origin 
trade remedies in preference giving countries . 
 
The above captioned objectives will need to be pursed both at a multilateral level and in 
bilateral trade agreements between Africa and the developed countries. 
 
Further, the prospects, provided for in both AGOA,249 and the Cotonou Agreement of 
Africa entering into negotiations with reciprocal trade arrangements with the US and the 
EU respectively, presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the continent’s trade 
strategies for these two critical trade partners.250 
 
 
4.6 Improving Africa’s participation in the WTO 
 
To take advantage of the new global environment, African countries would need to 
strengthen their capacity to participate in the World Trade Organization System.251 This 
entails the ability to: identify and exploit trading opportunities; effectively defend trading 
rights; fulfill rights; fulfill obligations and execute development polices within the 
framework of these obligations and define and pursue interests in future trade 
negotiations.252 
 
The NEPAD trade enforcement strategists need, therefore, to focus on the following 
commitments as discussed in the above WTO document: 
 
                                                 
249 African Growth Opportunity Act, (AGOA). This is a US policy to help in the development of African 
countries and increase their market access into the US market. 
250 See information on trade treaties at www.infoexport.ge.ca , See also, www.itcsd.org/weekly/02-11-
07/story6 [ccessed on 4 October 2007].  
251 See Getting to know WTO, www.id21.org, see also Partial Guide to WTO, A Publication by 3D 
Geneva, www.3dthree.org/en/complement.php?IDcomplement=36&IDcat=4&IDpage=14.  
252 WTO (n. 247 above) 5 
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Strengthening efforts to integrate trade polices into national development polices 
geared towards poverty eradication and capacity building in trade policy and related 
areas, such as, tariffs, customs, competition, investment, and technology, including 
through the use of the Integrated Framework for trade- related technical assistance for 
LDCs. 
 
Improving economic openness and policy predictability as well as sound macro-
economic policy, is another strategy for developing Africa. Developing human and 
institutional capacity, for effective and unformed participation in the multilateral 
trading system, and for effective negotiations on trade, finance, technology transfer 
and related areas. They also need to remove procedural and institutional bottlenecks 
that increase transaction costs, including through efforts to improve efficiency and 
transparency by the implementation of trade facilitation measures and improving 
standards. 
 
4.7 Intensifying and deepening intra-African regional integration 
 
The potential for regional integration in Africa has been fully realized and concerted 
action by African countries is required to intensify and deepen the various integration 
initiatives on the continent.253 
 
While integration in Africa is constrained by a host of structural, policy and 
organizational factors, the progress of current initiatives also depends on the political will 
of the participating countries.254 This presents a challenge to the African Union. The key 
consideration is if it will be necessary and feasible to have an overcharging mechanism 
within the framework of the union to accelerate the objective of intra African trade and 
economic integration. 
 
 
                                                 
253 See Multi – Stakeholder Consultative Workshop to review NEPAD, www.afrodad.org/downloads/nepad 
[accessed on 12 October 2007]. 
254 NEPAD Workshop (n.239 above) 11 
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4.7.1 The NEPAD trade agenda for Africa 
 
While the role of the international community in helping African countries address 
poverty through trade based growth is indispensable, the African countries themselves 
have a clear agenda on trade255.  Part of the agenda is linked with their global market 
share but the rest of it is concerned with domestic actions. These include building supply 
capabilities and diversification of trade mainstreaming of trade polices in national 
development and deepening regional economic integration.256 
 
African countries can play a major part in their capacity to trade with other African 
governments and engage in economic reforms that are aimed at addressing supply 
capacity constraints. By reallocating budget spending towards capital expenditures in 
productive sectors such as value- added industrialization and focusing on main- 
streaming trade polices in development strategies, African countries can fully compete 
with the developed countries.257 
 
Markets were removed on some transitional support provided to Africa to take care of 
preferences erosion and other adjustment costs associated with global trade liberalization 
without increased supply and trading capacity. Africa will not have a sustainable outcome 
in which trade plays its expected role unless there African trade integration is 
deepened.258 
 
The policy framework for investment is intended to assist governments to create an 
environment that attracts domestic and foreign investment taking into account the broader 
                                                 
255 Firmino G Mucavele, ( n.198 above)  21. 
256 Firmino G Mucavele (n.255  above) 23. 
257 Yoweri Museni’s, address to Uganda Manufacturer’s Association at the UMA show grounds. New 
vision, October 2004. 15. 
258 Yoweri Museveni (n.257 above) 15. 
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interests of the communities in which the investors operate.259 The framework helps 
countries develop a sound investment environment by fostering an informed process of 
policy formulation and implementation across government agencies. 
Based on best practice drawn from OECD and non-OECD experiences, it proposes a set 
of practical policy consideration in ten inter- related areas that go beyond stable macro-
economic considerations which contribute to such an investment environment.260 
Governments can consider these policy considerations in country self- evaluation and for 
reform implementation, regional cooperation and peer reviews in multilateral discussions. 
 
The fundamental questions in the investment policy  framework address: investment 
policy, promotion  and facilitation, trade policy, competition policy, tax policy, corporate 
governance, human resource development, infrastructure and financial sector 
development.261 
 
A country’s trade policy influences both domestic and foreign investment and is 
important for any development strategy. Investment has long been recognized as the key 
ingredient for economic growth and development. 
 
4.7.2     The changing inter- relationships of trade, domestic investment and FDI 
 
The relationship between international trade, domestic investment and FDI is complex and 
intrinsically interlinked as earlier discussed under chapter three. To begin with, trade can 
either substitute for or compliment FDI. Market seeking firms262  can serve foreign 
subsidiaries. The latter effectively substitute FDI for trade. 
 
                                                 
259 Jean monnet center, 1997. online http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org,97/97-12 html [accessed on 2 
October 2007]. 
260 OECD, 1996. 
261 OECD, 1996. 
262 FDI is often classified into four types according to the investing firms’ motives: market seeking (to get 
access to new foreign markets), Resource seeking (to get access to resources not available at home), 
efficiency seeking (to take advantage of cost differences/scale economies and rationalize production), and 
strategic asset seeking (to acquire strategic assets or prevent competitors from obtaining them). Dunning, J. 
(2002), “Determinants of FDI: Globalization induced changes and the role of FDI in polices”, paper 
presented at the ABCDE – Europe Conference, Oslo, June 24, 2002. 
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FDI (and to a lesser extent domestic investment) can induce imports in the short term. An 
investing firm, for instance building a new plant, may require capital items only available 
(or cheaper) from foreign sources. Credit rating agencies evaluating emergency serving 
debt are aware of the impact on the current account, and will at times discern between 
types of imports and pure competition or nonperforming investment verses capital 
imports for an investment that will earn its costs.263 
 
4.7.3 Proposed areas of action 
 
From the conclusions reached at in the meeting of the OECD African investment 
Advisory Board,264 participants invited the OECD, the NEPAD, and key African and 
international partners to turn the following proposals into concrete actions for 
implementation over the next three years. The OECD stands ready to support these 
activities, together with NEPAD and other international and regional organizations, and 
to act as a catalyst for the on going efforts at policy reform. The following sub- 
paragraphs examine several proposals that were discussed on participation inputs.265 
 
4.7.3.1 Supporting investment Peer Review process 
 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)266 is about self monitoring, peer learning 
and promoting the adoption of the principles and standards of good governance and 
international best practice. The review mechanism could explore variations of the 
domestic policy framework for FDI in Africa including general laws and regulations, 
public services, macroeconomic policies, customs procedures, the regulation of FDI, 
incentives and trade related investment measures. 
 
                                                 
263 Dunning J (n.262 above) 24 
264 8th September 2003, Geneva meeting, more information from www.oecd.org. 
265 OECD 2003. 
266 In an effort to enhance the quality of governance in Africa, the 6th Summit of the Heads of State and the 
Government implementation Committee (HSGIC) held on 9th March 2003 adopted a memorandum of 
Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which contains prioritized and approved 
codes and standards in four focus areas\: Democracy and Good Political Governance; Economic 
Governance and Management; Social Economic Development and Corporate Governance.  
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OECD’s investment policy reviews methodology and experience could be shared with 
NEPAD in support of its efforts to develop a set of relevant “best practices” for African 
governments seeking to increase FDI.267 
 
One idea to pursue in this context may be organizing an OECD-NEPAD working session 
of government officials on “investment capacity building; how and what for.” This 
working session could discuss the experiences of OECD and others with investment peer 
reviews,268 and helps identify priority areas for peer review in light of African country’s 
investment needs. 
 
The OECD initiative, which non-OECD partners are invited to actively participate in 
would be done on a regional and sub- regional basis.269 This discussion would include; 
public governance, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and the linkage 
between FDI and local business development. 
 
4.7.3.2 Enhancing investment through an improved institutional and regulatory 
framework 
 
Poor public governance and lack of adequate transparency have been for a long time a 
chief bottleneck to investment, both domestic and international in African countries.  The 
resulting poor economic development and increasing poverty has in turn further 
deteriorated public governance in many African countries. Breaking out of this circle is 
therefore a precondition to using private sector investment to recover regional economies. 
 
A number of OECD recommendations and principles in the area of public governance 
used as reference points on a global level can serve as a general benchmark for Africa. 
That is policy recommendations on regulatory reform, principles of managing ethics in 
                                                 
267 OECD 1996.  
268 Peer Review in this case is an integral part of capacity building. It provides an opportunity to transfer 
knowledge and experiences; help develop best practice; and assists compliance with rules and 
commitments. 
269 OECD 1996.  
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the public service, guidelines for managing conflict of interest in the public sector and 
guiding principles for successful E-government.270 
Actions should be identified together with NEPAD and other African partners. 
 
Good Corporate Governance is part of a broader investment framework supportive of 
sustainable growth and development in Africa.271 Indeed, NEPAD’s July 2002, 
“Declaration on democracy, political economic and corporate governance”, suggested 
that all African countries should strive to comply with a set of eight standardized codes 
and practices related to economic and corporate governance.272 NEPAD has also called 
upon the African Development Bank to develop a framework for reviewing corporate 
governance practices in Africa, drawing upon the OECD principles and other sources.273 
 
A range of Africa’s specific corporate governance related initiatives are already 
underway. Recognizing the importance of African ownership in corporate governance 
reform efforts and building upon existing initiatives, the OECD will continue to play a 
supporting role to the Pan African forum as a member of its steering committee and 
having gained in adopting the OECD principles to arrange economic and political 
circumstances through its roundtable experiences in other regions. 
 
The OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises (MNE’S)274 and its work on 
promoting corporate responsibility  initiatives can be used to further enhance  the positive 
contribution  of MNE’s to African host societies. This would also build on more recent 
OECD work on corporate responsibility in extractive industries. 
 
An important contribution can be made in this regard by TUAC275 and BIAC.276 TUAC 
organized meetings in Zambia and Morocco aimed at raising awareness, sharing 
experiences and benchmarks with regard to the implementation of the OECD guidelines. 
                                                 
270 OECD(n.265 above) 12. 
271 See Smunda S Mokoena, op.cit. 
272 NEPAD 2002. 
273 OECD 1995.  
274 OECD 1995. 
275 Trade Union Advisory committee to the  OECD, 1995. 
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4.7.3.3 Enhancing linkages between foreign invested enterprises and SME’S 
 
Small and medium enterprises (SME’s) are viewed as a critical sector for growth, 
employment and poverty alleviation in Africa. Building stronger SME’s - FDI linkages is 
an issue of great interest to most African partners. The lack of adequate domestic 
investment and markets remain a major deterrent to FDI inflows. 
 
NEPAD’s work focuses on how to make SMEs better local partners for foreign investors 
to make African economies more attractive to FDI and to strengthen the benefits of 
foreign investment to the local economy. Another equally important area could be 
expanding the ways and means of ensuring that African SMEs benefit from expanding 
regional and international trade opportunities and identifying the roles of the international 
community and stake holders to facilitate this process. 
 
Regional integration in Africa is seen as critical to creating a larger economic space with 
more opportunities for investors and entrepreneurs. There are considerable unexploited 
opportunities in Africa to promote growth through regional cooperation. Creating larger 
and more integrated markets, facilitating cross border investment and allowing the free 
movement of people and exchange of ideas carries economic as well as political benefits. 
 
Existing initiatives277 are all designed inter alia to gain from economies of scale and 
attract investment. It is of foremost importance for African development to strengthen 
regional cooperation (through initiatives such as the Zambia Malawi Mozambique growth 
triangle).278 
                                                                                                                                                 
276 Business and Industry Advisory committee to the OECD. 
277  OECD 1995. 
278 The World Bank in supporting regional efforts to create integrated markets and initiatives is aimed at 
increasing cooperation to address common issues in a regional context, such as the Nile Basin initiative and 
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Current OECD research on FDI related issues in preferential trade agreements involving 
developing countries is focusing on southern Africa. The role of cross- border 
infrastructure in regional integration could also be explored and institutions such as the 
World Bank and the East African Development Bank could be invited to contribute. An 
OECD Development center study on “regional integration, FDI and competitiveness: the 
case of SADC279 has been established and could be used by African and other partners’ to 
support regional integration efforts.” 
 
4.7.3.4 Corruption 
 
The NEPAD initiative could explore possibilities for establishing regional and sub- 
regional networks to fight corruption. Broad co-operation with international 
organizations, private sector and civil society should be sought.280 Analyzing the private 
sector perceptions (2001) in Uganda, corruption was a frequently mentioned problem,281 
and described by investors as cumbersome and which could slow down the investment 
move in developing countries. 
 
4.7.3.5   Strengthening Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) 
 
A framework could be developed to share best practices in investment promotion. The 
various experiences of OECD member countries with NEPAD and African IPA partners, 
in close cooperation with UNCTAD, UNIDO and the World Bank, could help to enhance 
the promotion, policy advocacy and transparent functions of the IPAs on the continent.282 
                                                                                                                                                 
WAEMU payments systems. Initiatives such as the EU- Southern Africa free trade Area and US- SACU.  
free trade area promote regional integration and help expand inter-regional trade; www.worldbank.org  
279 Effective regional cooperation and integration in Africa is constrained by many factors such as lack of 
infrastructure (for example across border transportation network in key in many African countries to 
achieving a regional market that is sufficient to attract investors, both foreign or domestic), tariff and non -
tariff barriers, lack of political commitment, weak harmonization of policies, overlapping and multiplicity 
of organizations.  
280 See Transparency International (2005), Understanding the African Union Convention on preventing and 
combating corruption and related offences, third edition. 
281 An Investment Guide to Uganda, Opportunities and Conditions, 2001 52. 
282  UNCTAD 2002.  
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4.8    Conclusion 
 
It is encouraging that African leaders themselves have reflected on the importance they 
attach to trade and investment in Africa in the design of NEPAD through the AU 
jurisdiction although there is debate to separate NEPAD from AU and make it a separate 
legal entity. Experience shows that sustainable trade and investment in Africa is essential 
for reducing poverty. And consequently, NEPAD is right to set ambitious goals for 
economic growth in Africa. Achieving these goals will depend to no small extent on 
integrating African countries more strongly into international investment and trade. 
 
OECD and NEPAD ministers agreed during their meeting on 16 May 2002 to seek ways 
in which the OECD could contribute to best development practices, aid effectiveness, the 
promotion of trade and investment, good governance and approaches to sustainable 
development in Africa. OECD is working together with NEPAD and the AU, the African 
Development Bank, the World Bank group and other key partners to develop an African 
Trade and Investment initiative.283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
283 See Paper by Richard Hecklinger (2003), “The OECD Strategy on Investment for Development: 
Creating a framework for Dialogue and Learning”; Presented at the OECD Global Forum on International 
Investment 17-18 November 2003, Johannesburg.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having discussed extensively Africa’s growth and investment strategies under chapter 
four, the researcher will conclude this thesis with a drawback on bilateral investment 
treaties in relation to foreign direct investments and the way forward to a multilateral 
investment agreement in global trade. 
 
The move towards a multilateral investment agreement has not been an easy one 
following the various attempts that have been made first at the ITO, then OECD and now 
at the WTO. The members of the OECD  that have been the major players in advocating 
for a multilateral investment agreement have been the leading industrialized and capital 
exporting countries in the global economy. Unfortunately, having failed to win enough 
support from developing countries and the least developing countries especially from 
Africa and Latin America, as well as environmental, labour and human rights activists, 
the agreement could not be concluded as hoped by 1998, and some members participating 
are suggesting that it is time to start negotiations at the WTO. 
 
The question of whether the agreement will register success at the WTO is left to the key 
negotiators to decide and remove such doubt, although it would make it more meaningful 
to have a multilateral agreement like this one discussed and concluded where other 
international trade agreements are regulated and concluded. For an agreement to be 
concluded at the WTO, it has to be consistent with other obligations of WTO members 
 
 
 
 
 78
and subject to the same procedures under the dispute settlement and adjudication 
mechanisms.284                                                                                                                                                     
According to the researcher, the WTO is a credible institution where other related 
agreements have been signed and successfully enforced and there is no doubt therefore 
that the MAI too could fall into this category once discussions start there. The major 
complaints that arose from the OECD proposed multilateral agreement were that, the 
organization consisted of ‘like-minded’ people and had not involved members from the 
developing and least developing countries to participate in the drafting of this agreement 
yet they are the vulnerable group to the policies therein. Even so, under the proposed 
agreement, there was little mentioned about environmental and labour standards where 
developing countries have large concerns. 
 
There is enough evidence that the WTO takes into consideration the needs of all its 
members especially those from the developing countries and LDC’s. 
This can be seen from the non-discrimination principles of Most-favoured Nation and 
National Treatment.285 Countries are not allowed to discriminate between their trading 
partners whether from the perspective of domestic products or imports. Secondly, when it 
comes to accession, developing countries are always given more time to prepare to 
accede. This is unlike the procedure which the OECD members used of no consultation 
and simply presented the agreement for signing. Such an improper move would definitely 
limit membership and further marginalize the LDC’s. 
 
Thirdly, the WTO has a large membership than the OECD. The OECD as earlier 
observed in chapter one consists of thirty members which accounts for a small portion of 
the global economic countries, whereas the WTO involves more trading countries 
including the developed and developing countries. Clearly, therefore, if the OECD MAI 
                                                 
284 The “talking FDI blues” and an investment treaty in Trouble. The Economist 346, no.8059. 14 march 
1998. 
285 The MFN principle prohibits any kind of discrimination or favours between trading partners. It states 
that each member shall grant any other member the most favourable and best treatment it grants to any 
other e.g., if a member grants lower customs to one member, the same should apply to all other members. 
This applies to both trade in goods and services. Whereas the NT principle applies to domestic and 
imported products, it prohibits giving preferential treatment to the domestically produced goods as against 
the imported products. Both should be treated in the same way if they are ‘like-products.’ 
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was considered, many countries would be marginalized since they are not members of the 
OECD and accession to the agreement would be limited to the countries that are already 
economically powerful. 
 
In designing a multilateral investment agreement, it is important therefore that the major 
players are involved,286 these include the developing and least developing countries. 
Accordingly, there have been major protests against the MAI. As earlier noted in chapter 
four, Africa is already coming up with its own strategy giving more reason for it to be 
given chance to participate in global trade. 
 
More so, in order to succeed in MAI negotiations, negotiators should ensure a balance 
between the interests of investors and the host countries because this was another area 
that led to rejection of proposed MAI. The negotiation framework should be flexible 
enough to allow a situation where national laws will be applicable to investors. 
 
As discussed earlier, developing countries have signed both bilateral and plurilateral 
agreements either among themselves or with other developed countries. The multiplicity 
of these agreements is based on the presumption that BITS are more flexible than the 
multilateral framework and the question of whether BITS increase FDI is not certain. 
Countries with a more stable economy tend to have increased FDI flows than those in 
transformation, therefore given the fact that Africa is characterized by political 
instabilities, poor infrastructure, low levels of technology and worst of all corruption, 
even with the signing of many BITS they attract little FDI. Unless the above mentioned 
problems affecting many African countries have been addressed by governments, efforts 
to enjoy the benefits of foreign investment may be futile even at the multilateral level. 
 
There is a need for African countries to first deal with the problems that are affecting 
their economies before joining the international investment framework if they want to 
benefit from foreign investment. 
 
                                                 
286 These include, developing and least developed countries. 
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